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Abstract 
This thesis is about U.S. self-defense laws and how they affect women who kill in 
self-defense. I argue that U.S. self-defense laws do not work well to protect women who 
kill in self-defense because these laws were originally written by men to protect 
themselves in masculine situations of violence, and thus do not account for women’s 
experiences. Many women experience severe intimate partner violence that threatens 
their lives, which is a departure from the scenarios self-defense laws were originally 
created to protect against and thus demands different considerations. In my research, I 
reviewed all homicide cases in which the defendant pleaded self-defense in the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in the 21st century. I found that when women kill and claim 
self-defense, they almost exclusively kill abusive intimate partners, yet they face 
marginally more prison time on average than men, who often kill friends, strangers, 
and acquaintances in public settings. I explored in depth the cases in which women 
defendants killed their abusers and identified four main challenges they faced in 
successfully convincing judges and juries that they had acted in self-defense. First, the 
women lacked documentation of a history of abuse. Second, abusive men were viewed 
as non-deadly if they were unarmed. Third, prosecutors often portrayed the women as 
liars with ulterior motives. Fourth, the court often misused or misunderstood expert 
testimony relating to battered women.  
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Introduction 
 This thesis examines United States self-defense laws and how they affect women 
pleading self-defense to homicide charges. Modern U.S. self-defense laws as we know 
them evolved from English common law, a body of legal norms developed from judges’ 
decisions. These laws popped up in medieval England, a time when women were 
considered property of and subsumed all their rights to their husbands and fathers.1 As 
such, public male violence was common and private male violence toward women was 
legal. When the U.S. was founded and adopted English common law, self-defense laws 
were meant to apply to two different situations of violence in which a man would need 
to defend himself. The first situation was a random attack by a violent assailant. The 
second was two people of roughly equal physical ability entering into fist fight, such as 
a modern-day bar fight.2 In the U.S. today, self-defense laws vary state-by-state, but 
generally include that a person can use a reasonable amount of force to defend him or 
herself against an imminent threat.3 Since self-defense laws were written by men to 
protect men in masculine situations of violence, their development did not remotely 
consider the experiences of women. In the history of self-defense laws, women are 
absent, evidenced by the fact that from the establishment of the colonies to the 20th 
century, there were only three documented appellate self-defense cases with a woman 
defendant.4  
 
1 Cynthia K. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1989). 
2 Ibid., 41. 
3 George E. Dix, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials (St. Paul, MN: West Academic 
Publishing, 2015). 
4 Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law. 
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In the late 20th century, some scholars started to explore how women were 
affected by these male-constructed laws, producing a wave of works, most notably 
Justifiable Homicide by C.K. Gillespie, founder of the feminist legal organization now 
called Legal Voice. These scholars called attention to the fact that women may be 
disadvantaged by self-defense laws, because the situations in which women kill in self-
defense are a far cry from the kind of situations in which men kill in self-defense. Unlike 
the scenarios of a random violent assailant or a fist fight among physical equals, women 
often have to defend themselves from abusive intimate partners, such as husbands and 
boyfriends. Intimate partner violence affects a staggering number of women in the U.S., 
with one in four women reporting that they have experienced severe intimate partner 
physical violence, sexual violence, or stalking in their lifetimes.5 Intimate partner 
violence is the single largest cause of injury to women in the U.S., and intimate partners 
are the perpetrators of about one third of homicides committed against women, by a 
conservative estimate.6 Unfortunately, the criminal legal system has not been able to 
halt intimate partner violence, as it is a crime that often evades arrest and is serially 
under-prosecuted.7 Despite fearing that their lives are in danger from the brutal 
physical and sexual violence they experience at the hands of their abusers, many 
women feel that seeking a solution in the criminal legal system is futile and that leaving 
the relationship is more dangerous than staying, a feeling supported by research.8 These 
 
5 Jennifer L Truman, “Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003-2012,” (2014). 
6 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Criminal Law, Cases and Materials (Durham, North Carolina: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2017). 
7 Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law. 
8 Jacquelyn C Campbell et al., “Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: 
Results from a Multisite Case Control Study,” American Journal of Public Health 93, no. 7 
(2003). 
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women may be financially dependent on their abusive intimate partners. They may 
have children with them. They may love them. 
While there are no national statistics about the number of women who kill their 
abusers in self-defense, a study by the New York Department of Corrections and 
Community Supervision in 2005 found that sixty-seven percent of women imprisoned 
for killing someone close to them, besides their children, had been abused by their 
victim.9 Additionally, in one 2004 study conducted by the Department of Justice, half of 
the women surveyed in a maximum security prison in the Southeast had acted in self-
defense or retaliated after abuse.10 Nationwide, most women awaiting execution on 
death row are either imprisoned for a crime relating to child abuse or intimate partner 
violence involving a male partner.11 These figures are supported by literature that 
identifies the motivations behind men and women who kill. In homicide cases, men are 
more often motivated by possessiveness and a desire to control, whereas women are 
usually motivated by fear. Men are more likely than women to kill strangers or 
acquaintances, whereas women more often kill someone they know.12 In incidents of 
intimate partner homicide, women often kill their abusers, while men kill out of 
jealousy, rage, or perceived or actual infidelity.13  
 
9 Eliot Spitzer and Brian Fischer, “Female Homicide Commitments: 1986 Vs. 2005,”  
State of New York Department of Correctional Services (2007). 
10 Dana D. DeHart, “Pathways to Prison: Impact of Victimization in the Lives of 
Incarcerated Women,” Violence Against Women 14, no. 12 (2008). 
11 Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy: a Story of Justice and Redemption (New York: Spiegel & 
Grau, 2014). 
12 Geris Serran and Philip Firestone, “Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male 
Proprietariness and the Self-Defense Theories,” Aggression and Violent Behavior 9 (2004). 
13 Danielle Rosiejka, “Killing for Possession and Killing for Survival: Gender and the 
Criminal Law of Provocation and Self-Defense.” Law School Student Scholarship 54 (2012). 
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While there existed a body of research on how self-defense laws affected women 
in the late 20th century, I could not identify if anything had changed since then, if at all. I 
wanted to explore whether the theoretical problems that women encountered pleading 
self-defense to homicide charges, as detailed in the literature, still existed today in real 
life. I wanted to know whether women were disadvantaged when pleading self-defense 
to homicide charges.  
My research indicates that women are seldom successful in convincing juries and 
judges that they killed their abusive intimate partners in self-defense and are thus 
legally innocent and should not face prison time. In my research, while women 
claiming self-defense to homicide charges received comparable prison sentences to men 
claiming self-defense to homicide charges, women almost exclusively killed abusive 
intimate partners in self-defense, while men mostly killed acquaintances, friends, and 
strangers. When women killed in self-defense, it was often in a private home, while 
men often killed in self-defense in public settings, such as a bar, nightclub, or store. In 
examining why women had difficulty in successfully pleading self-defense, I identified 
four main themes. First, women had trouble making the case that they were abused if 
they did not have a lengthy paper trail of police reports documenting prior abuse. 
Second, abusive men were treated as non-deadly if they were unarmed. Third, 
prosecutors often casted women defendants as liars with ulterior motives, putting their 
history of abuse into question. Fourth, the court often misused or misunderstood expert 
testimony relating to battered women, which had the potential to make a decisive 
difference in how the juries evaluated the women defendants’ actions.  
 
 
5 
Introduction to Research  
 For my research, I read all of the homicide cases from the 21st century in which 
the defendant claimed self-defense that appeared before the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals or one of the federal district courts that the Sixth Circuit has appellate 
jurisdiction over. This U.S. court of appeals covers the states of Ohio, Michigan, 
Tennessee, and Kentucky. I chose this court because I am from Columbus, Ohio and 
attend school in Ann Arbor, Michigan, so I am familiar with the region. It also had a 
substantial but doable caseload—higher than average after I put in my search 
parameters—but not as high as a few of the courts that cover the most populated urban 
areas.  
I read all relevant cases, including cases with men defendants to compare to the 
cases with women defendants. I read 234 cases in total. I found these cases by searching 
for the terms “self-defense” and “homicide” from the database NexisU, which houses 
court decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts. I then skimmed 
each case and discarded the ones where the search terms erroneously appeared, and 
only thoroughly read the homicide cases in which the defendants claimed they killed 
the victim in self-defense, either to their attorneys or at trial. I then documented the 
basic facts of the cases, including what charges the defendants originally faced, what 
they were convicted of, how many years they were sentenced to in prison, what kind of 
weapon was involved, and whether the defendant was in an intimate relationship with 
the victim. I used the data I collected from this case review to form a broad comparative 
overview between women and men defendants, presented later in my findings section. 
After reading these 234 cases, I returned to the cases in which a woman killed her 
abusive intimate partner, and identified themes appearing throughout these cases of 
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interest, attempting to articulate why women encounter challenges in killing abusive 
partners and pleading self-defense.  
 While I would have preferred to read cases from lower courts with original 
jurisdiction, these documents are not available online. I was necessarily limited in the 
scope of the cases I could read. Therefore, in every case I read, the defendant had 
already been convicted and was appealing his or her conviction. The main independent 
variable of interest in the case review is the gender of the defendant, and the dependent 
variable is the outcome of the case, defined in years sentenced. There are a wide range 
of other possible independent variables, including age, race, religion, or ethnicity of 
defendant, jury make up, or background of the lawyer. A study of the effects of each of 
these variables would probably lead to interesting findings and generate conversations 
about other biases that exist in the U.S. legal system. While I do not mean to discount 
the impact and importance of the other independent variables, they are not the main 
subject of my interest, so I am focusing solely on the gender of defendant. My research 
is both unique in that I have not found a similar study conducted in this century, and 
important in that it has far-reaching implications for how the U.S. can modernize self-
defense law to be more fitting to the experiences of women and to better protect victims 
of intimate partner violence. 
A Note on Terminology   
In this thesis, I talk about intimate partner violence in gendered terms, often 
referring to women as the victims and men as the perpetrators. This is not to invalidate 
the intimate partner violence that men experience; it is merely a reflection of larger 
national patterns about intimate partner violence. Women are almost twice as likely as 
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men to experience severe physical violence in their relationships.14 Women are much 
more likely than men to experience types of abuse beyond just physical violence, 
including sexual violence and stalking.15 Women often experience a range of physical 
violence beyond hitting and kicking that men generally do not report experiencing, 
including being strangled, suffocated, and attacked with knife or gun.16 The fact that 
intimate partner violence is a gendered issue does not mean it affects all women in the 
same way. Women’s experiences of violence are inherently impacted by race, ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and disability. 
Further, I focus on intimate partner violence in heterosexual relationships. This is a 
reflection of the cases that I read. Of the over 200 cases I reviewed, only one involved a 
homosexual couple. I am not attempting to downplay the violence that people in the 
LGBTQ+ community experience. For the purpose of this thesis, however, I am 
interested in the power dynamics at play between men and women, which often 
manifest in heterosexual relationships.  
Additionally, I focus on the binary genders of men and women. All I have access to 
are court documents in which the genders of the subjects and perpetrators of the crimes 
are not explicitly stated and are instead implied through pronoun use. I am taking the 
pronoun “she” to refer to a woman and the pronoun “he” to refer to a man. No 
nonbinary “they” pronouns appeared in the cases I reviewed. This is not to exclude 
nonbinary people from this discussion of gender and violence. I am merely centering 
my thesis around the cases I read.  
 
14 Leigh Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to 
Intimate Partner Violence (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2018). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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In recent years, there has been a discussion over what to call people who have 
experienced violence, particularly sexual violence. The discussion oscillates between the 
terms “survivor” and “victim.” While I acknowledge that the term survivor may be a 
source of empowerment for those who have lived through trauma, I am going to be 
referring to those who have experienced intimate partner violence as the victims of such 
violence. The court itself refers to subjects of violence as victims, and I want to be 
consistent in my language. I want to acknowledge that people who have experienced 
violence can identify in whatever way they are most comfortable with, and I am not 
attempting to reduce anyone to labels.  
Intimate Partner Violence in the U.S. 
 Before explaining the deficiencies of self-defense laws in protecting women who 
kill their abusers, I discuss the prevalence and severity of intimate partner violence in 
the U.S. and its repercussions on those affected. I explore how the criminal legal system 
often fails to protect victims from their abusers, and why women often cannot just leave 
abusive relationships, as prompted by skeptics. I then dive into the parts of self-defense 
laws that are problematic for women who kill their abusive intimate partners in self-
defense.  
 While intimate partner violence may be widely acknowledged and condemned 
today, it did not enter public consciousness as a serious criminal offense until the 
1970s.17 The decisive turn to the criminal legal system as a response to intimate partner 
violence began in 1984, when the U.S. Attorney General’s Task Force on Domestic 
 
17 Edna Erez, "Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview" Online 
Journal of Issues in Nursing 7, no. 1 (2002). 
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Violence called for a stronger criminal legal response to intimate partner violence.18 In 
the 1990s, women’s groups lobbied Congress for years to produce the Violence Against 
Women Act, the first comprehensive federal legislation to address intimate partner 
violence.19 The legislation dedicated almost a billion dollars to women’s shelters, 
required states to recognize protective orders against abusive partners issued in other 
states, and dedicated resources to increasing the arrest and prosecution of abusers.20 
While in the past, police were not allowed to make warrantless arrests for assault 
because it was a misdemeanor, now almost every state has expanded police authority to 
arrest abusers.21 The criminal legal system is now the primary response to intimate 
partner violence in the U.S.22 Even though intimate partner violence was treated with 
serious national concern in the late 20th century, the perception that intimate partner 
abuse is different than other violent assaults persisted into the 21st century. Long after 
intimate partner violence was deemed a criminal offense, many states defined sexual 
assault and rape as only criminal when the victim was not the perpetrator’s wife.23 
Despite federal and state legislative efforts, by all estimates, intimate partner 
violence is still rampant in the U.S., with recent studies reporting that one in four 
women and one in nine men experience severe intimate partner physical violence, 
 
18 Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to Intimate 
Partner Violence. 
19  Kit Kinports, “So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense.” Saint Louis University Public Law Review 23, no. 155 (2004), 176. 
20 U.S. Congress, Senate, To combat violence and crimes against women on the streets and in 
homes (Violence Against Women Act of 1993), S. 11, 103rd  Cong., 1st sess., introduced in 
Senate January 21, 1993.   
21 Kinports, “So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense.” 
22 Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to Intimate 
Partner Violence. 
23 Erez, “Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview.” 
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sexual violence, or stalking in their lifetimes.24 At least one million women are assaulted 
each year.25 The fact that intimate partner violence is common does not make it less 
dangerous, or potentially deathly. Intimate partner violence is the single largest cause of 
injury to women in the U.S., and intimate partners are responsible for about one third of 
homicides committed against women, at a conservative estimate.26 Women are killed by 
intimate partners more often than by any other perpetrator.27  
One 2003 landmark study attempted to identify the risk factors for femicide, 
homicide committed against women, in abusive relationships. The researchers found 
that the abuser’s access to a firearm and abuser’s use of illegal drugs were among the 
factors most strongly associated with intimate partner femicide.28 After controlling for 
other factors, the abuser using a gun in the worst incident of abuse increased the 
likelihood of intimate partner femicide forty-one-fold.29 This was reflected in the stories 
of severe abuse I read when researching my thesis, in which abusers would assault or 
rape their victims using a gun.  
 The abuse that women experience from their partners is habitual, and rarely ever 
stops at one incident. Research indicates that once a man develops a pattern of abusing 
his intimate partner, it is highly unlikely that he will ever willingly stop, and the 
violence will just likely increase with time.30 Furthermore, the techniques that people 
usually employ to avoid violence often don’t work for battered women. The two main 
 
24 Truman, “Nonfatal Domestic Violence, 2003-2012.” 
25 Kinports, “So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense.” 
26 Saltzburg et al., Criminal Law, Cases and Materials. 
27 Campbell et al., “Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study.” 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law, 129.  
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techniques identified by sociologists to avoid violent confrontations—withdrawal from 
the situation and agreement with the accusations made by the aggressor—are shown to 
be ineffective for battered women who are facing accusations and threats by their 
abusers.31 Studies show that beyond escaping, the only thing a woman can do once her 
abuser has begun an assault is to passively submit to it.32 
It is often asked, both in public discourse and in the courtroom, why these women 
do not just leave their abusive partners.33 The argument goes that no one is forcing them 
to stay in abusive relationships; they are electing to do so. A battered woman claiming 
that her only option was to kill her abuser or be killed is silly—she could have simply 
left him.  
There are many anecdotal reasons why a woman would not leave her abuser. She 
may fear retaliation from her abuser. She may be concerned about the fate of her 
children and losing custody. She may be financially dependent on her abuser.34 Like 
most people, she may expect to stay married to the person she fell in love with, and 
constantly employ strategies to deescalate the violence.35 
There are ample empirical studies illuminating just how dangerous it is for women 
to leave their abusive partners. At least half the women who leave their abusers are 
stalked, harassed, or attacked by them in some form.36 In one study of intimate partner 
homicide, more than half of the men who killed their partners did so after they were 
 
31 Ibid., 132. 
32 Ibid., 133.  
33 Rachel Louise Snyder, “When Can a Woman Who Kills Her Abuser Claim Self-
Defense?” The New Yorker, December 20, 2019. 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/when-can-a-woman-who-kills-her-
abuser-claim-self-defense. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law. 
36 Saltzburg et al., Criminal Law, Cases and Materials. 
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separated, citing the loss of control as a primary motivator.37 In the study identifying 
risks of femicide, the researchers found that being separated from an abusive partner 
after living together, as well as asking to separate or having been separated in the past, 
was associated with a higher risk of death for a battered woman.38 
With the threats to safety that come with leaving an abusive relationship, some 
might point to personal protection orders, or restraining orders, as a solution. Seeking 
protective orders can be far from safe for battered women. A protective order may 
provoke a battered woman’s abuser even more, as he fears he is losing control of the 
situation and other parties are becoming involved.39 It may prompt him to file a 
protective order against her, as if she were the threat.40 Furthermore, these orders can be 
difficult to enforce. Studies show that at least half of protective orders are violated at 
least once, and many are violated repeatedly.41 Still, the police are more much likely to 
arrest an assailant who is a stranger.42 Police are reluctant to arrest an abuser with a 
protective order unless some unrelated crime was committed.43 
Given how dangerous it is for a woman to leave an abusive relationship and how 
risky it can be to seek a protective order, it is realistic for her to believe she only has two 
choices—to kill her abuser or to be killed by her abuser.44 
 
37 Ibid. 
38 Campbell et al., “Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study.” 
39 Kinports, “So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of Battered 
Women’s Self-Defense.” 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, Self-Defense, and the Law, 152. 
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The Role of the Criminal Legal System 
 In discussing intimate partner violence and why women cannot just leave abusive 
relationships, it is important to elaborate on the role of the criminal legal system. In 
Justifiable Homicide, Gillespie explores at length how police, prosecutors, and judges 
have failed to treat intimate partner violence as a serious crime.45 She describes how 
some police may consider intimate partner violence a civil matter rather than a criminal 
one, and treat calls that report such violence as low priority. She discusses the reasons 
prosecutors often don’t bring intimate partner violence cases to court, including lack of 
prestige, the belief that abusing an intimate partner is not a real crime, or the belief that 
women are using the legal system to settle relationship quarrels and manipulate their 
partners. However, the biggest reason that prosecutors don’t bring intimate partner 
violence cases to court, according to Gillespie, is that they believe the victim will change 
her mind and drop the case. This creates a vicious cycle; since intimate partner violence 
cases are not treated as serious or desirable, women encounter challenges when 
attempting to pursue charges, which further discourages them from seeking recourse 
through the criminal legal system and makes prosecution of intimate partner violence 
even less frequent.  
 Up until the 1960s, police arrests in the case of intimate partner violence were rare. 
Intimate partner violence had yet to be considered a serious criminal act, and many 
police viewed such domestic disputes as not real police work.46 Police were trained not 
to make arrests in intimate partner violence cases.47 Although there was a proven 
 
45 The following section will draw upon Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered Women, 
Self-Defense, and the Law. 
46 Erez, “Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview.” 
47 Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to Intimate 
Partner Violence. 
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pattern of under-enforcement of calls reporting intimate partner violence, it was not 
clear whether it was related to state laws that prevented officers from making 
warrantless arrests.48 For example, some states required that the officer be present for a 
misdemeanor assault in order to make an arrest.49 One woman described her experience 
with the police’s failure to help in her case of intimate partner violence: “every time I 
went to the authorities, they laughed at me stating that they, the law, would have to see 
my husband kill one of us before they could help.”50 Under-enforcement of the law was 
a significant concern in low-income communities and communities of color.51 
 In the late 1970s, feminist lawyers, frustrated with the police’s inaction and failure 
to enforce laws against intimate partner violence, sued police departments in New York 
City and Oakland, California for policies that avoided arresting perpetrators.52 
Concerned about incurring similar lawsuits, jurisdictions across the country looked to 
different policing practices that shielded them from liability. A 1977 Oregon law 
emerged as a model, which required police to make arrests in intimate partner violence 
cases when the officer had probable cause to believe an assault had been committed, a 
precursor to mandatory arrest policies that required police officers to arrest 
perpetrators.53 By the 1990s, there was a decisive shift toward pro-arrest policies, and 
over three quarters of jurisdictions in the U.S. allowed police to make warrantless 
 
48 Erez, “Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to Intimate 
Partner Violence, 1. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
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arrests in the case of intimate partner violence.54  As of 2014, twenty states and 
Washington, D.C. had mandatory arrest policies.55 
 While the number of arrests did rise dramatically, arrest levels still remain low. 
One Ohio study evaluating the effectiveness of pro-arrest policies found that arrest 
levels rose from about twelve to eighteen percent-in the past to about thirty-two 
percent.56 That is partly due to the fact that police still draw upon personal opinions 
about intimate partner violence when evaluating whether to arrest a perpetrator. As 
described by Edna Erez, criminologist and former chair of the American Society of 
Criminology Task Force on Violence Against Women, in Domestic Violence and the 
Criminal Justice System: An Overview, “[r]esearch has demonstrated that even when law 
or policy dictate arrest, the police still exercise discretion in finding that a crime has 
occurred, and do not always use arrest as a response to domestic violence. For instance, 
considerations such as an officers’ interpretation or understanding of the law; 
ideological factors or the beliefs officers hold regarding battered women; practical 
considerations such as the amount of work involved in processing an arrest compared 
to the likelihood of a reprimand for failing to do so; and political issues such as the 
relationships between police department administrators and street officers, are all 
factors that affect the decision to arrest batterers.”57 
 Erez’s overview of intimate partner violence and the criminal justice system 
corroborates Gillespie’s insights on why intimate partner violence cases are rarely 
prosecuted. Intimate partner violence is often comprised of a series of events, with little 
 
54 Erez, “Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview.” 
55 Goodmark, Decriminalizing Domestic Violence: a Balanced Policy Approach to Intimate 
Partner Violence. 
56 Erez, “Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview.” 
57 Ibid. 
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physical evidence and no witnesses.58 The victims themselves often refuse to testify, 
“citing fear of retaliation by their partners, concern about exposing their partners to 
criminal liability, or opposition to having their partners incarcerated, because 
incarceration would deprive them of economic, emotional, parenting, and other forms 
of support.”59 These crimes are often charged as misdemeanors, and due to a high 
turnover rate, perpetrators do not gain the criminal record that would indicate 
dangerousness to a prosecutor or judge.60  Further, victims of intimate partner violence 
engage in the criminal legal system sometimes with motives other than seeking 
convictions for their abusers. For example, they sometimes want immediate protection 
from their abusers, or want the abusers to receive help.61 Once victims have reached 
their aims, they are inclined to withdraw their case even if a conviction hasn’t been 
brought about.62 As such, few intimate partner violence cases reach the courtroom, and 
fewer receive convictions.63  
 In recent years, some people have advocated moving away from the U.S. criminal 
legal system as the primary response to intimate partner violence. According to 
University of Maryland law professor Leigh Goodmark and author of Decriminalizing 
Domestic Violence, “[t]he reassessment [of the role of the criminal legal system] is driven 
by concerns that the criminal legal system is ineffective, focuses disproportionately on 
people of color and low-income people, ignores the large structural issues that drive 
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intimate partner violence, robs people subjected to abuse of autonomy, and fails to meet 
the pressing economic and social needs of people subjected to abuse.”64 
 The first reason Goodmark cites is the ineffectiveness of the criminal legal system 
in halting intimate partner violence. Rates of intimate partner violence dropped 
between 1994 and 2000, the years immediately after the passage of the Violence Against 
Women Act, but so did overall crime rates.65 Between 2000 and 2010, rates of intimate 
partner violence fell even further, but by less than the overall crime rate fell. According 
to Goodmark, no reliable social science data has tied the decrease in intimate partner 
violence rates to the increase in funding and criminal legal system response spurred by 
the Violence Against Women Act. Further, the evidence of criminalization having a 
deterrent effect on intimate partner violence is inconclusive. Incarceration in particular 
may induce violence instead of preventing it. Perpetrators are sent to institutions where 
they witness more violence and can become perpetrators or victims of such violence. 
Further, incarceration is linked with unemployment after release, and rates of intimate 
partner violence correlate with male unemployment.  
 The criticisms of criminalizing intimate partner violence mirror the criticisms of 
criminalization generally. Criminalizing intimate partner violence is an example of 
using the criminal legal system as a tool to achieve social justice. Both critiques are 
concerned with the disproportionate effect of criminalization on men of color. Some 
criticisms, however, remain unique to the criminalization of intimate partner violence. 
According to Goodmark, criminalization can harm the women it is meant to help. Since 
the introduction of pro-arrest policies, arrest rates have increased among women 
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significantly, even though women do not commit acts of violence at nearly the same 
rate as men. In particularly, arrest rates of women of color for intimate partner violence 
are higher in mandatory arrest jurisdictions. Lastly, police involvement in families 
experiencing intimate partner violence can put the mothers at risk of being reported to 
child protective services for failing to protect their children from exposure to violence. 
 With raising these criticisms of the criminalization of intimate partner violence, it 
is important to highlight its benefits. Laws prohibiting intimate partner violence 
validate the experiences of victims and clearly state that what has been done to them is 
wrong. Laws have expressive value; they communicate what a society’s values are and 
what is socially harmful. They legitimate harm and allow victims to see themselves as 
harmed. Additionally, criminalization can increase safety for victims. Some victims 
report that criminal sanctions such as jail time and probation give them the opportunity 
to put short and long-term precautions into place to protect themselves from their 
abusers. Some research suggests that arrests do have an impact on perpetrators and can 
make the lives of victims safer. In the study identifying risk factors for femicide, 
researchers found that a perpetrator’s prior arrest for intimate partner violence actually 
decreased the risk for femicide, which suggested that arresting abusers can protect 
against future intimate partner homicide.66 
Women Who Defend Themselves 
 Given what we know about the incidence intimate partner violence of the U.S., 
how dangerous it is for women to leave their abusive partners, and the failure of the 
criminal legal system to stop intimate partner violence, it is no surprise women feel that 
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they have no option other than to kill their abusive partners or be killed. A growing 
body of research indicates that fear of intimate partner violence and self-defense from 
abusive partners are main drivers behind women who kill or use violence. It is difficult 
to know how many women are imprisoned for killing their abusive intimate partners in 
self-defense; no national dataset exists. However, one 2004 study conducted by the 
Department of Justice surveyed sixty women imprisoned at a maximum-security prison 
and found that almost half of them said they acted in self-defense or retaliated against 
abuse.67 Another 2008 review by researchers at Yale University and University of South 
Carolina found that the vast majority of women who used violence against their 
intimate partners had been victims of intimate partner violence themselves, citing 
multiple studies in which around ninety percent of women surveyed who used violence 
had also been victims.68 Further, the landmark femicide study found that no matter who 
was killed, anywhere from sixty-seven to eighty percent of intimate partner homicides 
involved the man abusing the woman before the killing.69 The 2008 review also 
highlighted that women’s use of violence is more likely than men’s to be motivated by 
fear and self-defense.70 One study of women who had used violence against their 
intimate partners in the past six months found that that self-defense was the most 
commonly-cited motive for the violence, with seventy-five percent of participants 
saying that they had acted in self-defense.71  
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 It is difficult to pinpoint why some women kill their abusers and others don’t. One 
1983 study discussed in Justifiable Homicide compared a group of battered women that 
killed their abusers and a control group of battered women that did not.72 They found 
three main differences. First, the group who killed their partners suffered from far more 
severe and frequent beatings at the hands of their abusers. Second, they experienced 
more severe and frequent sexual abuse from their abusers. Third, they sustained more 
serious injuries as a result of the abuse. In the study, killing an abusive intimate partner 
was a matter of how serious, frequent, and life-threatening the abuse was.  
 As for how the women who kill their abusive partners in self-defense actually fare 
in court compared to men, that is partly the undertaking of my project. Again, it is 
difficult to compare men and women defendants on the hole, as there is no 
comprehensive dataset of everyone who has killed and claimed self-defense either 
privately to their lawyer or publicly in a courtroom. One 2020 New Yorker article 
explored this issue, and requested that a senior fellow at N.O.R.C. at the University of 
Chicago, John Roman, analyze F.B.I. data to shed light on the differences in outcomes 
between men and women who claim self-defense.73 Roman looked at the number of 
justifiable homicides, or killings that are deemed to be done without criminal guilt, of 
which self-defense is one, from 1976 to 2018. He found that the likelihood of a justifiable 
homicide ruling in cases in which men killed other men was ten percent greater than 
when women killed men.74 This finding bolsters my argument and illuminates that 
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there is a discernible difference in justifiable homicide cases with women defendants 
and men defendants. 
 The imprisonment of women who kill their abusers in self-defense manifests in 
larger, equally concerning trends of women imprisonment across the board. Women are 
now the fastest growing group of the incarcerated population.75 From 1978 to 2015, the 
women’s state prison populations grew 834 percent, more than doubling the pace of 
growth of the men’s population. My states of interest—those covered by the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals—embody this national trend. In Michigan, the number of men 
incarcerated fell by eight percent between 2009-2015, whereas the number of women 
incarcerated grew by thirty percent. In Kentucky, almost half the prison growth in that 
same time period was in women’s prisons, even though these prisons have much 
smaller total populations than men. In Ohio and Tennessee, in the same six years, more 
women became newly incarcerated than men. Further, women around the country are 
more likely to enter prison with a history of trauma, abuse, and mental health issues. 
Once in prison, many women are sexually abused by prison staff or other women, and 
are more prone to experiencing severe psychological distress than incarcerated men. 
Many incarcerated women facing the most serious sentences committed crimes related 
to intimate partner violence. Nationwide, most women awaiting execution on death 
row are either imprisoned for an allegation of child abuse or intimate partner violence 
involving a male partner.76  
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Why Self-Defense Laws Are Problematic for Women 
While I have walked through the circumstances that may drive a woman to kill 
her abuser in self-defense, I have yet to highlight the parts of self-defense laws that 
prove problematic for women. To illustrate the problems that the language of self-
defense laws can pose, let’s examine the self-defense law in Michigan, excerpted from 
the Michigan Self-defense Act: “An individual…. may use deadly force against another 
individual anywhere he or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if… the 
individual honestly and reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to 
prevent the imminent death of or imminent great bodily harm to himself.”77  The 
literature I’ve read raises many problems with the language of self-defense laws, and 
two are salient here. The first is that the individual must reasonably believe it is 
necessary to use deadly force, which I will be referring to as the reasonableness 
requirement. The second is that the threat of death or great bodily harm must be 
imminent, which I will be referring to as the imminence requirement. 
Reasonableness Requirement 
 The reasonableness requirement is problematic for women for a few reasons. 
First, it is rooted in something called the “reasonable man standard.” Starting in the 19th 
century, English courts started adopting a reasonable man standard, where the legal 
validity of an action was determined by what a reasonable man would do.78 In terms of 
self-defense cases, the standard was applied to decide how much force a reasonable 
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man would use to defend himself from a threat of violence. As a result, the reasonable 
man standard invites the jury to view any situation of violence as a fight between men.79 
As described by lawyers and legal scholars Elizabeth M. Schneider and Susan B. Jordan, 
“standards of justifiable homicide have been based on male models and expectations. 
Familiar images of self-defense are a soldier, a man protecting his home, family, or the 
chastity of his wife, or a man fighting off an assailant.”80  
 Modern American courts have revised this standard to be gender-neutral, but its 
origins still remain rooted in the male experience, of which women’s experiences do not 
comply. Women are less likely to have experience fighting, often deal with socially-
imposed rules about physical aggression, and are typically of smaller stature than men, 
all of which have an impact on a woman’s perception of the reasonableness of using 
deadly force to defend herself from an imminent serious threat.81 For example, a woman 
using a weapon to defend herself from her unarmed abuser could be seen as 
unreasonable, as if she was exceeding the threat she originally faced. However, a 
woman may need a weapon to adequately defend herself, because she may be unable to 
defend herself from a man with her physical strength only, as another man perhaps 
could.82 She is then labeled as unreasonable, even if she had no other option. Masculine 
notions of reasonableness are imposed on battered women whose reasons for self-
defense do not comply with such a framework.  
 Second, the reasonableness requirement leaves a woman defendant to convince a 
jury that what she did was reasonable and not an overreaction. This is difficult because 
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of cultural perceptions of women that find their way into the courtroom. Women are 
perceived and portrayed in popular culture as dramatic, irrational, and emotional, a 
stereotype that some jurors have subconsciously consumed for years. Some jurors may 
also have a hard time believing that a normal-seeming man could commit such horrible 
acts. Others may fear that ruling in favor of a woman would give other women a license 
to kill their partners and claim self-defense.83 Others may just be repulsed by the idea of 
a woman being violent. Cultural views about women using violence against men are 
deep-rooted. When self-defense laws originated, a man killing a woman was sometimes 
considered murder and other times completely allowed, whereas a woman killing a 
man was considered treason, and she was burned alive at the stake.84 
 In reality, a woman’s perceptions of what is reasonable is shaped by her past 
experiences of abuse from her partner. Some women receive death threats that they 
have every right to take seriously. Others have nearly died in previous encounters. The 
literature suggests that battered women are nearly unanimous in their belief that their 
abusers are capable, both physically and mentally, of killing them.85 The threat of death 
by an abusive partner is not solved by simply leaving that partner. Many women 
believe that the act of leaving will get them killed. As I’ve discussed, evidence shows 
that the most dangerous time for a battered woman is when she is attempting to leave 
her abuser.86 A reasonable battered woman differs from any other reasonable woman in 
that she is familiar with her abuser’s attacks and understands the severity of his threats, 
she is often hypersensitive to his actions and can sense when a beating is imminent, and 
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she understands the uselessness of relying on other means of protection.87 These factors 
are not apparent to people who have not been abused and therefore do not influence 
their perception of what is reasonable, but they are highly relevant in determining 
reasonableness for a battered woman.  
 Additionally, the failure of the criminal legal system to take intimate partner 
violence seriously may leave women to believe that seeking the help of police and 
lawyers is useless. In one case, State v. Norman (1989), a woman named Judy Norman 
was tried for first-degree murder for shooting and killing her husband while he was 
sleeping after he had allegedly abused her for years.88 The serious abuse included 
beatings, cigarette burns, thrown objects, forced prostitution, starvation, making her 
sleep on the floor, and forcing her to bark like a dog, among other things. She was 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to six years in prison, although on 
appeal her conviction was reversed because the jury had not been instructed on self-
defense laws. At Norman’s trial, witnesses described her experiences with both social 
service agencies and law enforcement, which “contributed to her sense of futility and 
abandonment through the inefficacy of their protection and the strength of her 
husband’s wrath when they failed.”89 Experiences like Norman’s, and the feeling of 
having no source of outside support or alternative options, contribute to an explanation 
of why a woman would believe it is reasonable to kill an abusive partner.  
 In discussions of reasonableness, victims of intimate partner violence are often 
seen as seeking special treatment by the criminal legal system, as if it has to make 
exceptions to the traditional reasonableness requirement to be specifically tailored to 
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these victims. Under conventional self-defense doctrine, however, the question is 
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s circumstances would have believed she 
was under imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.90 For example, in 
traditional self-defense law, physical attributes of both the defendant and victim, 
including size, are strength, and physical condition, are considered relevant when 
evaluating whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would’ve perceived 
an imminent serious threat.91 Furthermore, defendants are traditionally permitted 
under criminal law to introduce evidence about the reputation or violent history of the 
victim to bolster their claim that they honestly and reasonably believed they were under 
threat of deathly or serious bodily harm.92 With abused women, it is no different. Their 
perceptions of reasonableness are necessarily informed by their specific circumstances, 
which complies with traditional self-defense doctrine as opposed to seeking an 
exception. 
Imminence Requirement  
 The second part of self-defense laws that proves problematic for women is the 
imminence requirement. Here, imminence is generally defined as “immediate danger, 
such as must be instantly met, such as cannot be guarded against by calling for the 
assistance of others or the protection of the law.”93 In other words, the imminence 
requirement means the homicide is unjustified if it’s too soon or too late. In the case of 
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killing an abusive partner in self-defense, it can be very hard to prove that death or 
great bodily harm were imminent. When intimate partner violence has been routine 
and reaches a point where a woman believes her life is in danger, if she waits until her 
partner is in the midst of abusing her, then she may die. A woman typically kills her 
abuser before this point, because she often has every reason to believe that her partner 
will be the death of her. For example, women who have been chronically abused whose 
lives are in danger may come to reasonably believe that the only time they can defend 
themselves is when their abusers are asleep.94 This may be the case because fighting 
back during beatings has only escalated the violence, and attempts at leaving the 
relationship have only posed more danger. 
 An analogy is often drawn between an abused woman who knows her abuser 
will be the death of her, and a hostage who has been kidnapped and is slowly being 
poisoned by the kidnapper.95 The hostage knows the poison will kill her eventually, and 
if she has the chance to kill her kidnapper to save herself from eventually dying, she 
will, even if her death is not imminent. An abused woman is in a similar scenario of 
knowing that she is gradually dying at the hands of someone else. Yet, if an abused 
woman believes her life is in danger and kills her abuser in the middle of the night, she 
will not have satisfied the imminence requirement of self-defense laws because she 
cannot prove killing her abuser was necessary to prevent her death at that time. The 
imminence requirement fits more of a masculine, bar-fight type of scenario, where the 
nature of the violence might cause one person to die if they do not kill the other first at 
that very moment. 
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 Another reason it can be even more difficult for battered women to prove that 
death or great bodily harm were imminent is because they often recognize signs that 
precede abusive episodes that might not be obvious to a jury. Research indicates that 
battered women often become hypersensitive to their abusers’ behavior and the signs 
that predict beatings.96 In characterizing why imminence is difficult for battered women 
to prove, Goodmark highlighted the distinction between an attack by a random 
stranger “versus someone you’ve studied for a long time, whose tendencies you know 
very well. You can easily believe the threat is imminent, because you know what is 
coming based on your past experience.”97 In Justifiable Homicide, Gillespie gives the 
example of an abusive husband who would tap his wrists before he was about to abuse 
his wife, indicating that she should put her wrists together so that he could handcuff 
her. Just the act of tapping his wrists did not pose any immediate danger, but to his 
wife, it carried a potentially life-threatening message.98   
 Gillespie also highlights that the imminence requirement completely misses the 
mark in situations where a woman needs to defend herself from rape or sexual assault. 
In such cases, there really is no such thing as defending herself too soon; if the 
perpetrator is attempting to assault her, then rape is imminent. If she must wait to 
defend herself until that point, then she will be in plain danger of being raped. If she 
kills the perpetrator afterwards, then the act has already happened and is no longer 
imminent.99 Further, waiting until an abuser acts upon verbal threats to satisfy the 
imminence requirement puts the woman in more danger of dying. For example, “when 
a man who has beaten her up before says to his wife, 'This time I really am going to put 
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you in your place,’ it is hardly reasonable (or just) to expect that woman to wait, for the 
sake of the imminence requirement, until his hands are around her throat and she is 
losing consciousness before she acts to save herself."100 
Battered Spouse Syndrome 
In this next section, I discuss battered spouse syndrome, a set of features that are 
thought to characterize abusive relationships and the effects they have on victims. 
Battered spouse syndrome will later be relevant when I discuss my findings, as expert 
testimony on the subject was often misunderstood, mishandled, or not permitted in the 
cases I read where a woman pleaded self-defense to killing an abusive partner. When 
battered spouse syndrome was first conceived in the late 1970s, it was called battered 
woman syndrome, and that was the terminology used in the beginning of the 21st 
century, when the cases I read began. In more recent years, the court moved away from 
that terminology and toward using battered spouse syndrome, which is gender-neutral, 
so I reflect that transition by using the term battered spouse syndrome in my thesis.  
The term battered woman syndrome was first coined by psychologist Lenore Walker 
in her book The Battered Woman, published in 1979, to describe the effects of intimate 
partner violence.101 One of her most well-known findings was the cycle of violence that 
abusive relationships go through. Walker found that these relationships often 
experience a tension-building stage between the perpetrator and the victim, in which 
the perpetrator becomes agitated with the victim and the victim senses the onset of 
abuse. This stage peaks with an abusive incident, followed by a period of adoration and 
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contrition, in which the perpetrator is apologetic and tries to win back the affection of 
the victim. The stages then repeat. Walker also explained her theory of “learned 
helplessness,” in which victims learn that they cannot prevent or control future beatings 
and eventually come to feel that abuse is unavoidable and there is no escaping the 
relationship.102 She highlighted the reasons women stay in abusive relationships, 
including “not only their feelings of helplessness and the reinforcement they received 
during the third stage of the cycle, but also other factors - namely, fear, lack of 
resources, concern for children, love for their partner, shame, and lack of external 
support resulting from the batter’s efforts to isolate them from others.”103 
Additional common effects of abuse include that it creates a constant state of fear 
among victims and a perception that the abusive intimate partner is omnipotent.104 
There is also a common belief among victims that the next beating will be the one that 
kills them.105 Additionally, victims are often unwilling to confide in the people that they 
are close with out of shame, humiliation, fear of what would happen if the abusive 
intimate partner found out, or a feeling that they won’t be believed.106 In some victims, 
the abuse triggers a form of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a psychiatric 
disorder that can occur in people who have witnessed or experienced an extremely 
traumatic event.107 Victims of intimate partner violence can exhibit common symptoms 
of PTSD, including reliving the trauma in flashbacks, attempting to avoid triggers, 
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exhibiting avoidance behavior such as being unable to recall traumatic events, and 
experiencing arousal symptoms such as hyper-vigilance, irritability, and sleep 
disorders.108  
Psychologists and experts on battering and its effects can provide testimony in 
criminal trials to provide the jury with more context to make an informed decision on 
the culpability of the defendant. Battered spouse testimony is routinely admitted in 
every state.109 In the cases of women killing their abusers in self-defense, the point of 
such expert testimony is to shed light on the reasonableness of the women’s actions. As 
discussed earlier, the jury may bring preconceived notions of battered women to the 
courtroom. According to Gillespie, “unless the defense is allowed to educate the jurors 
and the judge about what has been learned about battered women in recent years, they 
will have no choice but to fall back on what they know.”110 The point of expert 
testimony is not to say that an abused woman is always justified in killing her abuser, 
nor is it an insanity defense, meaning that the defendant is not responsible for her 
actions because of a psychiatric disease.111  
 The term battered spouse syndrome and the way it characterizes victims have 
received ample criticism. Critics say the use of the word syndrome pathologizes 
battered women, which in turn undermines the reasonableness of their perceptions and 
actions.112 Others say it generalizes all battered women by creating one profile, of which 
some women don’t fit.113 This generalization could disadvantage certain groups who 
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appear less helpless to a jury, namely women of color and women who are financially 
independent.114 As early as 1996, a Justice Department report commissioned by 
Congress concluded that the term battered woman syndrome “was no longer useful or 
appropriate.”115 The authors cited that it “does not reflect the breadth of empirical 
knowledge now available concerning battering and its effects,” the term “implies that a 
single effect or set of effects characterizes the responses of all battered women,” and 
that the use of the word syndrome “may be misleading, by carrying connotations of 
pathology or disease.”116  The report found that “the interdisciplinary fields of domestic 
violence and traumatic stress, which reflect work in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, 
nursing, criminal justice, and other disciplines,” support the fact that intimate partner 
violence is associated with a wide range of traumatic psychological responses, as 
opposed to one response.117 
 Another line of criticism is that battered spouse syndrome gives rise to an 
affirmative battered spouse defense in court, which it doesn’t. It is not its own 
affirmative defense in a criminal case. Rather, a battered spouse defense means 
presenting battered spouse syndrome expert testimony to aid the jury in determining 
whether the defendant honestly and reasonably believed she was in imminent danger 
and thus has a valid self-defense claim.118  
 It is also worth noting that medical and legal definitions are not always identical 
and transferrable. Having a diagnosable medical condition does not invalidate a self-
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defense claim or a finding of reasonableness.119 As a replacement for the term battered 
spouse syndrome, the Justice Department report offered the terminology “battering and 
its effects,” which some researchers and expert witness have adopted to avoid 
confusion by the use of the word syndrome. Experts testifying in support of battered 
women today tend to “emphasize the social realities facing victims of [intimate partner] 
violence, including the control exercised by the batterer, the lack of alternatives 
available to the women, and the dangers of leaving the abusive relationship.”120 They 
describe how victims attempt to protect themselves and the challenges to receiving 
help, and their testimony often focuses on the non-psychological effects of abusive 
relationships.121 When I present my findings, I use the term battered spouse syndrome 
testimony to describe expert testimony on battering and its effects, because the court 
documents I reference use that terminology. I do not want to misrepresent the language 
that the court uses or alter what it is saying in any way.  
Current Self-Defense Laws 
 Before presenting my findings, I review the current state of the self-defense laws 
in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, which are under the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. I then mention a few developments in the 
revision of self-defense laws to show the direction in which self-defense laws are 
moving. 
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All four states have an explicit imminence requirement, but Kentucky differs from 
other states in that it uses a different definition of imminence. In the late 1990s, the 
Kentucky legislature adopted a definition of imminence in which for intimate partner 
violence cases, “belief that danger is imminent can be inferred from a past pattern of 
repeated serious abuse.”122 Kentucky is the only state I am aware of that uses such a 
definition and acknowledges a defendant’s history of intimate partner violence as 
affecting perceived imminence. Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee all mention 
imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm as grounds in which someone can use 
deathly force to defend themselves. Michigan and Kentucky mention imminent threat 
of sexual assault specifically as justification for using deathly force, and Kentucky alone 
mentions kidnapping.   
Of the four states, Michigan and Tennessee require the definition of reasonableness 
that was set forth earlier:“[the] individual honestly and reasonably believes the use of 
deadly force is necessary”.123 Tennessee places a special emphasis on reasonableness, 
mentioning it in the general statute and then later stipulating again that “[t]he belief of 
danger is founded upon reasonable grounds.”124 Ohio requires a bona fide belief, which 
is different than reasonableness in that it only requires the belief to be genuine, 
potentially avoiding the problems that arise when judging the reasonableness of a 
defendant.125 Kentucky requires only a belief of imminent danger: “The use of physical 
force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when…[t]he defendant believes 
 
122 KY Rev Stat § 503.010 (2015). 
123 MI Act 309 § 780.972 (2006). 
124 Mason v. Tennessee, U.S. Dist. Lexis 9462 (2011).  
125 State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St. 3d 91 (1986). 
 
 
35 
that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of 
unlawful physical force by the other person.”126 
All four states’ self-defense laws have places where an individual has no duty to 
retreat from a threat of violence. Kentucky and Michigan have variations of the castle 
doctrine, which means an individual has no duty to retreat from his or her home. The 
castle doctrine is a reminder of how old the origins of current self-defense laws are, 
since the doctrine emerged at a time when people literally lived in castles.127 In 
Michigan, the castle doctrine applies to the individual’s “dwelling,” meaning place of 
abode and any structures attached to that place, like a garage.128 In Kentucky, the castle 
doctrine extends beyond the individual’s residence and to their occupied vehicle.129 In 
Ohio and Tennessee, the exceptions to the duty to retreat are weaker, with no absolute 
lack of duty to retreat in the home. In Ohio, self-defense is presumed when an 
individual uses defensive force against someone who is in the process of unlawfully 
entering or having entered his or her residence or occupied vehicle.130 In Tennessee, this 
same language extends to businesses. Individuals are presumed to have acted in self-
defense when using defensive force against anyone who “unlawfully and forcibly 
enters or has entered [their] residence, business, dwelling or vehicle.”131  
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee all require that the defendant claiming self-defense 
was not the one that instigated the conflict. In Ohio, the defendant must show “[he] was 
not at fault in creating the situation.”132 Kentucky and Tennessee effectively have the 
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same rule as each other, which is that self-defense is not justified if “the defendant 
provokes the use of physical force by the other person or the defendant was the initial 
aggressor,” except if the defendant “withdraws from the encounter and effectively 
communicates to the other person his intent to do so and the latter nevertheless 
continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force.”133 Kentucky allows an 
additional exception if the defendant’s initial force was non-deadly. 
Ohio and Kentucky both allude to victims of intimate partner violence who kill in 
self-defense in their main self-defense statutes. In Ohio, the law states that a defendant 
pleading self-defense may introduce expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome as 
evidence to establish belief of an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. The 
law specifies that battered spouse syndrome is “a matter of commonly accepted 
scientific knowledge,” but the “subject matter and details of the syndrome are not 
within the general understanding or experience of a person who is a member of the 
general populace.”134 In Kentucky, an entire subsection of the law is dedicated to the 
admissibility of evidence of prior abuse in self-defense cases. According to the law, 
“any evidence presented by the defendant to establish the existence of a prior act or acts 
of domestic violence and abuse aby the person against whom the defendant is charged 
with employing physical force shall be admissible.”135 
It is difficult to review the state of self-defense laws as a whole because they vary 
state to state, but there have been a few notable developments in the way some 
jurisdictions handle candles of women killing their abusers and claiming self-defense. 
As I mentioned, Kentucky uses a definition of imminence for intimate partner violence 
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that acknowledges that the belief of imminent danger is informed by a past pattern of 
abuse.136 Additionally, some courts have turned away from using the reasonable person 
standard, and instead evaluate relevant self-defense claims by considering how a 
“reasonable battered woman,” or a reasonable person with a history of abuse, would 
have perceived the instance in question.137 The California Supreme Court, however, 
ruled in a 1996 decision that a reasonable battered woman standard could not replace 
the reasonable person standard. The court said the jury should view the situation from 
the defendant’s perspective, including all relevant circumstances, which is essentially 
what the reasonable battered woman standard is trying to get the jury to do anyway. 
There has also been some legislative action acknowledging how victims of intimate 
partner violence are treated by the criminal justice system. In 2012, Canada re-wrote its 
self-defense law to take into account not only the size, age, gender, and physical 
abilities of the parties, but also evidence of history of abuse between the parties. The 
goal of including this was to “contextualize the accused’s experience so as to allow their 
actions to be viewed and understood as objectively ‘reasonable’ in the circumstances.”138 
In May of 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law the Domestic 
Violence Survivors Justice Act, which seeks to reduce the sentences of victims of 
intimate partner violence who are convicted for a range of crimes committed in relation 
to their abuser. The bill allows judges to reduce sentences and redirect sentencing from 
incarceration to community-based rehabilitative programs, as well as allow for a small 
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population of incarcerated victims to apply for re-sentencing and earlier release.139 
Speaking about the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act, President and C.E.O of the 
New York Women’s Foundations Ana Oliveira said: “It begins to acknowledge in the 
law that there’s something else going on. You kill your torturer. Is that the same thing 
as a torturer killing you?”140 
Stand Your Ground Laws 
 In discussing self-defense laws and how they pertain to victims of intimate partner 
violence who fight back, the concept of Stand Your Grand laws often comes up. Stand 
Your Ground laws, which were first passed by Florida in 2005 and then popularized by 
George Zimmerman’s killing of unarmed African-American teenager Trayvon Martin, 
say that a person has no duty to retreat from anywhere he or she has a right to be, and 
does not have to go through any reasonable means to avoid danger before resorting to 
deadly force.141 Stand Your Ground departs from traditional self-defense law in that it 
authorizes the use of deadly force to protect property, changes presumptions of the 
reasonableness of using deadly force, extends the castle doctrine to dwellings and 
occupied vehicles, as seen in some of the states’ self-defense laws discussed above, and 
grants immunity from prosecution, and sometimes arrest, to people claiming self-
defense under Stand Your Ground.142 
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 Proponents of Stand Your Ground, such as the Chief Executive of the National 
Rifle Association Wayne LaPierre, have justified such laws by using rhetoric of female 
empowerment. The classic example is a woman using Stand Your Ground to defend 
herself from a stranger attempting to rape her in an alley. For example, at a 
Conservative Political Action Conference in 2013, LaPierre said that “the one thing a 
violent rapist deserves to face is a good woman with a gun.”143 In reality, though, 
according to University of Miami Law Professor Mary Anne Franks, instead of 
empowering women who fight back against aggressors, Stand Your Ground has 
resulted in “the normalization and promotion of (often white) male violence in an 
increasing number of scenarios.”144  
 According to Franks, Stand Your Ground is the chief narrative by which men can 
justify provoking deathly fights, whereas battered spouse syndrome remains the chief 
narrative available to women who fight back. Stand Your Ground is a justification 
defense, in which those who successfully claim it are deemed to have done something 
right. In some cases, Stand Your Ground allows claimants to evade evaluation by the 
criminal legal system altogether by granting them immunity from prosecution and even 
arrest.145 On the other hand, battered spouse syndrome is not a justification defense at 
all, and is often seen as an excuse for wrongdoing in which the woman needs to plea for 
mercy, subjecting her behavior and history of abuse to extensive scrutiny.146 Further, the 
female empowerment rhetoric used to justify Stand Your Ground doesn’t comport with 
reality. Rather than facing sexual assault at the hands of a stranger in an alley, women 
are more likely to be assaulted by intimate partners, friends, or family members in a 
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place they often feel safe, such as a bedroom.147 It is unclear how women are meant to 
stand their ground in such vulnerable scenarios, in which they don’t prepare or expect 
to need to use deadly force. 
Findings 
In presenting my findings, I first provide a broad overview of my data. I draw some 
overarching comparisons between the women and men defendants, showing how the 
situations in which women and men kill and plead self-defense are inherently different, 
and how self-defense laws apply better to scenarios of masculine violence. Namely, 
women predominantly kill intimate partners in self-defense, while men predominantly 
kill acquaintances, strangers, or friends in self-defense. Women often kill in the privacy 
of a home with few witnesses, while men often kill in public spaces such as bars and 
stores.  
After providing a broad overview, I take a deeper dive into the cases in which 
women killed their abusive intimate partners. I do this to show the specific hurdles 
women face in the courtroom, and to provide more detailed narratives of the very real 
women affected in these cases. The hurdles include: women struggling with a lack of a 
paper trail of police reports, abusive partners being deemed non-deadly if unarmed, 
prosecutors casting women defendants as liars with ulterior motives, and the court 
mishandling expert testimony relating to battered women. 
 
147 Ibid. 
 
 
41 
The Courtroom Is Accustomed to Men 
My research entailed thoroughly reading and documenting the facts and outcomes 
of 234 cases. Of the 234 cases, only ten cases had women defendants. I had to read over 
twenty cases with a man defendant in order to read one case with a woman defendant. 
This was nonideal in two ways. First, I would have liked to have a larger sample of 
women defendants, or at least one that was more comparable to the number of men, for 
the sake of having more data. Regardless, these ten cases still illuminate how women 
defendants are treated in a male-dominated criminal justice system.  
The second reason is more problematic. The fact that I read 234 cases, and only ten 
had women defendants, means that the federal district courts overseeing Michigan, 
Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee saw the same 234 cases, and the same ten women 
defendants. Courtrooms are used to dealing with men. Women defendants are rare, and 
their cases may necessitate other considerations and perspectives than the ones that 
suffice for men defendants. It seems as though, with only ten women defendants 
pleading self-defense to homicide charges over the course of almost twenty years, 
women are foreign objects to the courtroom. It is clear from the outcomes of the cases 
with women defendants that their experiences of intimate partner violence, experiences 
mostly unique to women, were not fully understood by a system that does not need to 
regularly consider them. 
Situations and Settings 
My research indicates that the situations in which women kill and plead self-defense 
are fundamentally different than the situations in which men kill and plead self-
defense. Out of the ten women defendants, eight of them killed men and one killed a 
woman. In the last case, the gender of the victim is unclear based on the available court 
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documents. Of the eight women who killed men, all of them killed abusive intimate 
partners. One was an ex-husband, four were current husbands, and three were current 
boyfriends. The abuse these women faced varied, but they all were unsuccessful with 
the self-defense theories they presented to their lawyers and at trial, as they were all 
ultimately convicted of some homicide charge.  
Further, the incidents of women killing abusive partners by and large took place in 
private homes, away from the public eye, without direct witnesses. Of the eight women 
who killed abusive partners, seven took place in private homes, and only one took place 
in public after exiting a car. Of the cases I reviewed, the standard case of a woman 
pleading self-defense looked something like this: the woman faced intermittent abuse 
from a partner over a long stretch of time, which culminated in either some episode of 
abuse, or in some moment when her partner was vulnerable, in which she used a gun 
or knife to kill her partner, and claimed that she did so because she feared for her life. 
Such an incident leaves no eyewitness but herself, and she is left to deal with a legal 
process that does not make it easy to prove a history of intimate partner violence.  
This standard case for women is far different from the standard case for men. Of the 
224 men defendants, twenty-nine killed women, twenty of which were in intimate 
relationships with the women. Of the twenty cases of intimate relationships, eighteen 
involved intimate partner violence from the men inflicted on the women, who 
ultimately were killed. The self-defense pleas appeared to be attempts to present the 
women as a threatening force during an abusive episode. Such killings are unfortunate 
testimonies to what happens if women don’t kill in the scenarios in which they feel their 
lives are threatened: the violence ultimately kills them.  
Considering women make up a small proportion of the victims of the men 
defendants, most of the cases I read were man-on-man crimes. An entire forty-four 
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cases involved some altercation regarding doing, selling, or buying drugs, which was 
about a fifth of all the cases I read. The incidents of men killing in self-defense in a 
public setting occurred at a much higher rate than women. For example, of the cases I 
read, sixteen occurred in a bar or club, ten occurred outside or inside stores, four 
occurred outside public housing complexes, and three occurred at gas stations. These 
often public fights that culminated in one man killing another in self-defense aligned 
with the situations that self-defense laws were originally designed for: random attacks 
by violent assailants and fights among physical equals.148 In this way, the self-defense 
cases I read with men defendants provided examples of the masculine conceptions of 
violence that underpin the self-defense laws themselves.  
Number of Years Sentenced 
The men and women defendants faced an array of homicide charges, convictions, 
and sentences, some more severe than others. Often defendants were sentenced to a 
range of years (e.g. fifteen years to life in prison), plus the sentences from the charges 
that can accompany a homicide charge, such as using a firearm in the commission of a 
felony, often called felony firearm. I simplified the years sentenced for each defendant 
to be the sum of the minimum number of years sentenced, so the numbers I present are 
the best-case scenario for those convicted. If a defendant was sentenced to fifteen years 
to life in prison plus an additional two years for felony firearm, the years simplified 
would be seventeen years. I rounded both life and death sentences to 100 years for the 
sake of the average calculation.  
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On average, the women defendants were sentenced to 61.423 years in prison. Of the 
ten women, three of them had life sentences. One of these women was individually 
sentenced to two life sentences. Even though most of these women had pleaded self-
defense for killing an abusive partner, they still on average spent almost a lifetime in 
prison.  
On average, the men defendants faced 61.23 years in prison, between two or three 
months less than the woman defendants. Even after controlling for men-on-men crime, 
men who killed women in intimate relationships were on average sentenced to 62.2 
years in prison. This surprised me. Although I suspected that women defendants would 
have trouble successfully pleading self-defense and being exonerated on their charges, I 
didn’t expect their sentences to be almost exactly the same as men. Given that women 
almost exclusively kill in self-defense to kill an abusive partner, I expected the women 
would receive somewhat reduced sentences. My findings proved otherwise, that 
despite women’s experiences of intimate partner violence and the serious threat to their 
lives their partners posed, women faced the same amount of years in prison as men, 
who often killed in self-defense over bar fights, drug deals, family disputes, and money. 
They even faced comparable years in prison to the twenty men who killed their intimate 
partners, eighteen of which had a history of abuse in the relationship.  
Success on Appeal 
All of the cases I read were appellate court cases, meaning the defendants had 
already been convicted and were appealing their convictions. The prospects of success 
of appeal were extremely bleak across the board for both genders, with the women in 
my small sample faring slightly better than men. Of the ten women defendants, only 
one had success in appealing her conviction. This appeal was later reversed in a 
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subsequent appellate court. Of the 224 men defendants, only thirteen had success in 
appealing their convictions. This seems to be more of a testimony to how difficult it is to 
appeal an original conviction, regardless of the gender of the defendant. Case after case 
raised numerous issues on appeal—often ineffective assistance of counsel or inadequate 
jury instructions—and case after case the judge rejected the defendants’ reasoning. In 
order for the conviction to be overturned, the error in the original trial needed to be so 
egregious that the appellate judge was sure the outcome would have been different if 
the error had not occurred.  
Issues Raised on Appeal  
Interestingly, the issues raised on appeal by the women defendants were noticeably 
different than the issues raised on appeal by the men defendants. Out of the ten women 
defendants, five of them claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, saying that their 
lawyers failed to introduce relevant self-defense evidence. That is half of the sample of 
women. Out of the 224 men defendants, sixty-three claimed the same, so a little over a 
quarter of the sample of men. The women in my study were more likely than men to 
not receive legal counsel that presented an extensive enough self-defense theory. At 
least, the women in my study were more likely than men to feel that they had not 
received legal counsel that presented an extensive enough self-defense theory. I will 
explore the specifics of the women’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and other 
legal challenges the women encountered later in this thesis.   
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Women Who Killed Abusive Intimate Partners 
In this section, I discuss in depth the eight cases of women who killed their abusive 
partners. After reading all 234 cases, I returned to these eight cases and dove deeper 
into the problems women encountered pleading self-defense in their original trials and 
what issues they raised on appeal. This second read was illuminating. The same themes 
appeared in the women’s stories and trials; their frustrations and challenges were 
recurrent. Some of the court decisions provided more detailed accounts of the abuse 
that the women suffered, others simply mentioned that they were abused. In my 
discussion, I provide the level of detail that was provided in the decisions, varying from 
case to case. After combing through the eight cases, I identified a few overarching 
themes, which I explore individually.  
First, at trial, many women encountered issues with lacking a paper trail that proved 
prolonged abuse in the relationship. Having just one documented police report was 
considered insufficient, and this lack of official documentation was used by the 
prosecution to bolster the argument that these women did not actually suffer abuse at 
the hands of their partners.  
Second, the abusive partners were largely considered not to be deathly threats if 
they were unarmed. There was an implication that a woman using a gun to defend 
herself was excessive when the man didn’t have a gun, neglecting the reality that 
abusive men can and do kill their partners without weapons.  
Third, prosecutors often characterized the women at trial as liars who may not 
actually have suffered abuse and had ulterior motives in killing their partners. The 
prosecutors played on cultural perceptions of women in a way that downplayed the 
violence the women faced and wrongly asserted the innocence of the men killed.  
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Fourth, expert testimony regarding battered women and battered spouse syndrome 
was limited, not permitted, misunderstood, or deemed irrelevant. Many women on 
appeal were frustrated with the lack of or mishandling of battered spouse syndrome 
expert testimony in their original trials, and the appellate court struggled to see how 
adequate battered spouse syndrome testimony would have affected the outcome of the 
trial.  
Lack of Paper Trail 
A few of the cases I read embodied the issues women face with lacking documented 
police reports of intimate partner violence when attempting to claim self-defense. As 
discussed earlier, there are many reasons why abused women would not have faith in 
the criminal legal system and hence why intimate partner violence is underreported. 
Police officers may treat intimate partner violence calls as low priority or elect not to 
arrest the perpetrator based on personal attitudes toward intimate partner violence.149 If 
the case gets brought to the county prosecutor, the prosecutor may not bring it to court 
for a multitude of reasons. The prosecutor may have difficulty in getting anyone to 
testify, may fear that the judge won’t take it seriously for lack of prestige or the 
perceived lack of abuser’s danger, or may believe that the woman will ultimately 
change her mind and drop the case.150 Sometimes women engage with the criminal legal 
system for motives other than obtaining convictions for their abusers, and withdraw 
their cases once they feel there is nothing else to be gained.151  
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 One case that exhibited issues with a lack of police documentation was Shimel v. 
Warren, which came before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Northern Division in 2015 and appealed to the 6th Circuit Court in 2016.152 In 
this case, Rebecca Shimel shot her husband Rodney Shimel nine times. Rebecca testified 
that her husband had abused her physically and emotionally throughout their thirty 
years of marriage, and that he had previously threatened to kill her. He had punched, 
strangled, and restrained her, as well as inflicted sexual violence. Early in their 
relationship, she had stabbed him with a knife while he was choking her. At the time of 
the killing, Rebecca was addicted to gambling and the family was having financial 
troubles. Rodney was working multiple jobs, and some money had gone missing. 
Allegedly, he was considering leaving the home and divorcing Rebecca.  
 Initially, Rebecca did not tell the detective that she thought her husband was going 
to kill her that day. She later said this was an effort to protect her family from media 
attention. At trial, Rebecca’s best friend from high school testified that Rebecca had 
shown her bruises from Rodney before, as well as a gun that Rebecca said her husband 
had threatened to kill her with. Rebecca’s daughters, however, did not recall witnessing 
any physical abuse. Rebecca’s lawyer met with her only twice, for a total of one and a 
half hours. He did not explain to her the sentencing guidelines or ask if she had any 
prior convictions. Rebecca was ultimately found guilty of second-degree murder and 
felony firearm and sentenced to eighteen to thirty-six years in prison for the murder 
charge, plus an additional two years for the felony firearm charge.  
 In her habeas petition, Rebecca claimed her defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present battered spouse syndrome testimony, as well as inadequate 
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communication. In this section, I focus on the failure to pursue battered spouse 
syndrome testimony. Prior to trial, the defense attorney was investigating a battered 
spouse syndrome claim and intended to hire an expert to evaluate Rebecca and provide 
battered spouse syndrome testimony. The attorney said he spoke several times with a 
lawyer from the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women and 
received information on prior cases that contained battered spouse syndrome 
testimony. He said that he spoke with Rebecca and her family about it, but decided not 
to present battered spouse syndrome testimony in the end. Instead, the attorney 
requested a plea deal, and eventually the prosecutor agreed to drop the open murder 
charge in exchange for Rebecca pleading guilty to second-degree murder, with no 
sentence recommendation. Her defense attorney said his intention was to get Rebecca 
out of prison sooner and with her family, which he thought would be better achieved 
with a plea deal than with presenting battered spouse syndrome testimony in court. 
Rebecca took the plea deal under her attorney’s advice without fully understanding 
what it meant.  
 Rebecca’s attorney’s main concerns with claiming self-defense were that Rebecca 
reloaded the gun while shooting Rodney, which indicates premeditation, and that there 
was not much evidence to prove a history of physical abuse. There was one 
documented incident of intimate partner violence in which Rebecca had called the 
police, which was not enough in the attorney’s eyes. When asked about whether he 
thought battered spouse syndrome was a viable defense, the attorney responded that he 
didn’t think it could be “sold” to a jury.  
 Out of the eight cases I read, this was the only one that even had a prior 
documented history of physical abuse. For reasons I discussed earlier, it is difficult to 
have a lengthy paper trial of evidence proving physical abuse. Even one documented 
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incident should be treated with significance. The court decided in favor of the defense 
attorney because Rebecca did not meet the burden of showing that battered spouse 
syndrome testimony would have been successful if it had been presented at trial. As far 
as I know, Rebecca is imprisoned in the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility 
less than ten miles away from the University of Michigan.  
 Another case I read that suffered from a lack of a paper trail was Bason v. Yukins, 
which appeared before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Southern Division in 2005 and the 6th Circuit Court in 2009.153 Lanise Bason 
killed her husband, Bryant Branch, by hitting him with a car that was going over forty 
miles per hour. She then crashed the car into a tree. At trial, witnesses and Branch’s 
family testified that Branch had had an affair, the couple fought, were separated, and 
were getting a divorce. The defense counsel called no witnesses and argued that the 
death was accidental, despite Bason’s claims that Branch was abusive during their 
marriage and she killed him in self-defense. The defense counsel maintained she had 
previously investigated and decided not to pursue the defenses of diminished capacity, 
heat of passion, and battered spouse syndrome. Bason was ultimately convicted of 
second-degree murder and sentenced to eighteen to fifty years in prison. 
 In her habeas petition, Bason argued that her trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to present a viable defense. It’s most relevant to this thesis to focus on why the 
counsel did not pursue a battered spouse defense. According to the trial counsel, she 
did not pursue such a self-defense theory in court because she could find no police 
reports of abusive activity, and the witnesses testified that they saw mutual fights 
between Bason and Branch. This implies that in order to pursue a battered spouse 
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defense, there would have had to be police reports of abusive activity. Not having the 
paper trial of police reports delegitimized Bason’s self-defense claim to her lawyer to 
the point where her lawyer did not think it was worth pursuing in court.  Second, this 
justification also implies the occurrence of “mutual” fights somehow contradicted the 
idea that Bason’s husband was abusive toward her and she suffered from battered 
spouse syndrome as a result. In reality, Branch could have been abusive, and the couple 
could also have gotten in mutual fights. The two are not mutually exclusive.  
In its decision reviewing whether or not the trial counsel was ineffective, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division said that in 
order to admit expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome, it must be reasonable to 
infer that the defendant was a battered spouse. The court casted doubt that Bason even 
was a battered spouse at all, and thus could not believe that she feared for her life at the 
time of the killing: “While there may have been evidence of physical fights with 
[Branch] in the past, the existing record does not establish that the defendant honestly 
or reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm 
sufficient to establish a claim of self-defense”.154 The court rested this opinion on the fact 
that the night before the killing, Branch had come to Bason’s house, treated her well, 
and not abused her. The court seemed to believe that Branch not abusing Bason on one 
night was sufficient evidence that Bason could not have feared for her life, which is not 
true. Bason could have feared for her life for reasons unrelated to what happened the 
night directly before the killing.  
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Abusers Considered Non-Deadly If Unarmed  
Across the cases I read, there was an implication that the woman claiming self-
defense was not under imminent deathly threat if her partner was unarmed or was only 
beating her using his physical strength. More broadly, the woman defendant was seen 
as escalating things if she used a weapon such as a knife or a gun to protect herself from 
her partner punching, hitting, strangling, or choking her. The idea that someone needs a 
weapon to be deathly is rooted in a masculine perspective. It is very plausible that a 
woman could fear for her life when facing an unarmed abusive man and could only 
reasonably defend herself using a weapon.  
This theme was present in the case Connell v. Andrews, which appeared before the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 2009.155 In the case, 
Linda Connell killed her husband of ten years, Alexander. In the time leading up to the 
killing, their marriage had become strained and they were planning on getting a 
divorce. The day before the killing, Linda had asked her friends if she could do target 
practice in their backyard with her gun. One of the roommates was uncomfortable with 
the idea and advised her not to keep a gun while she was dealing with marital stress. 
The other allowed her to do the target practice. The next day, Linda shot her husband 
twice, the details of which were not disclosed in the court’s decision. After she shot 
Alexander, Linda penned an apology letter, and then drove to the police station to turn 
in her gun and report a case of domestic violence. The police searched her home and 
found Alexander’s body. At the arraignment, Linda submitted a written not guilty plea 
by reason of insanity. At trial, she claimed that she shot her husband in self-defense. She 
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and felony firearm in Huron County, 
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Michigan, and sentenced to nine years in prison for the manslaughter charge and three 
years for the felony firearm charge.  
 In Linda’s habeas petition, she claimed that the trial court usurped the role of the 
jury by imposing a non-minimum sentence. She also claimed that she received 
ineffective assistance of counsel because her lawyer did not object to the sentence. 
Involuntary manslaughter convictions carry a minimum sentence of three years, and 
the maximum sentence that can be attached to that without any additional findings is 
three years, which still makes her nine-year conviction too long. The court’s reasoning 
was that they didn’t want to undermine the seriousness of the crime by only sentencing 
Linda to three years in prison.  
 More relevant to this section is the claim that Linda raised when she appealed her 
conviction to the appellate state court. On appeal, she said that the trial court erred by 
refusing to admit expert evidence about her husband’s drug use at the time of his death, 
which would’ve supported her self-defense claim. She alleged that the absence of this 
expert evidence prejudiced her trial. The expert toxicology that Linda was referring to 
would have explained the behavior that can result from drug use, and would have 
contextualized Alexander’s behavior, who Linda claimed was on drugs at the time of 
the killing. In reviewing the decision to exclude such testimony, the state court said the 
record contained no compelling evidence that Alexander was behaving in a drug-
induced, aggressive fashion when Linda shot him. On the contrary, the court claimed 
there was ample evidence indicating that Linda was the one who started the incident 
that lead to her husband’s death, because she was the one who went to the drawer and 
got the gun, which she admitted in her apology letter. In the state court’s owns words: 
“Appellant, not the decedent, but the gun in play. There is no evidence to suggest 
appellant had any reasonable cause to fear for her safety when she sought out the gun. 
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There is nothing to suggest a nexus between the decedent's substance use 
and appellant's act of aggression.”156 
 In this case, the court seemed unable to understand that the incident that lead to 
Alexander Connell’s death did not have to be isolated, and did not begin with Linda 
retrieving a gun. Linda could have reasonably feared for her life for a long time before 
she confronted Alexander. Once she took action and secured a gun, she was the 
instigator in the court’s eyes, despite Alexander allegedly being the perpetrator of the 
abuse that drove Linda to do what she did. In a reading of events that differs from the 
court’s, Linda putting the gun into play represents a potential sign that she feared for 
her life, not evidence that she did not. Alexander Connell did not need to put the gun 
into play to be life-threatening.   
 The next case of interest involves a knife instead of a gun, but demonstrates the 
same theme, nonetheless. In Hunter v. Andrews, a case that the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division heard in 2008, Thomia Hunter 
killed her on-and-off boyfriend Andrew Harris and claimed self-defense.157 The day of 
the killing, the couple had been drinking and returned to Hunter’s apartment to have 
sex. Hunter testified that she woke up to Harris accusing her of cheating on him. When 
she told him to leave, he hit her, and then obtained a knife and started poking it at her, 
cutting her leg. Harris continued to hit Hunter, so she retrieved a different knife from 
the kitchen. Harris then picked Hunter up by her throat and began to choke her while 
slamming her back and forth. Meanwhile, she fended him off with the knife. He pulled 
her head back and poured hot sauce in her eyes while she continued to blindly wield 
the knife. Once Harris fell, Hunter called 911 and reported that they were both injured. 
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She waited for the police and paramedics to arrive, and immediately told police that 
Harris couldn’t be dead because she had only stabbed him in the leg. The officers later 
testified that Hunter seemed shaken up and concerned about Harris’s condition.  
 Two knives were recovered from the scene. Only one had blood on it, and it was 
Harris’s. Harris had sustained nine deeper stab wounds and thirteen incised wounds, 
with some in his chest and arms, while Hunter only had a cut on her knee. The couple 
had previously lived together with Hunter’s daughter Marshia, who testified at trial 
about the extent of Harris’s abuse. Marshia testified that she had witnessed Harris kick 
in a door, throw things, and slam Hunter against a couch. On one occasion, after an 
argument between Hunter and Harris, Hunter and Marshia checked into a hotel so that 
they could hide from Harris. Marsha testified that the abuse occurred when Harris was 
drinking. Despite Hunter’s testimony explaining the sequence of events, Marshia’s 
testimony corroborating her mother’s experiences of abuse, and Hunter’s immediate 
self-defense claim and compliance with the police, she was convicted by a jury in 
Cuyahoga County, Ohio of felony murder and felonious assault. She was sentenced to 
serve fifteen years to life in prison.  
 In her habeas petition, Hunter claimed that she had ineffective assistance of 
counsel and that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser offenses than felony 
murder. In this second claim, Hunter argued that the state appellate court, which had 
heard her case on appeal and affirmed the lower court decision, erred in finding that 
she knowingly intended to injure Harris. The state appellate court has said that the 
evidence presented by Hunter did not support a self-defense claim because she had not 
demonstrated that she believed she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 
harm at the time of the killing. The court hinged this decision on the fact that the only 
blood found on a knife was Harris’s, and the only blood found on the blinds and floor 
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of the apartment was Harris’s as well. In the words of the state appellate court: “Thus, 
even if we assume that Harris caused the scrape on Hunter’s knee, the evidence 
demonstrates that Hunter used excessive force—22 knife wounds to Harris as opposed 
to one wound to Hunter—to defend herself.”158  
 In the same way that the court in Connell could not see how Alexander could have 
been a deathly threat without a gun, the court in Hunter could not see how Harris could 
have been a deathly threat without drawing blood. The court basing its decision almost 
exclusively on blood evidence is odd, especially because the abusive acts that Hunter 
mentioned—hitting, slamming her against things, strangling her—do not necessarily 
draw blood. This kind of psychical abuse is dangerous and does not need to break skin 
or draw blood in order to be deathly. Moreover, Hunter’s account of the abuse leading 
up to the killing aligned with the type of abuse Marshia had witnessed—kicking, 
throwing objects, slamming Hunter against a couch. These things do not necessarily 
draw blood either, but they can still be deathly. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division ended up siding with the state appellate 
court and denying Thomia Hunter’s habeas petition. As of now, she will spend up to a 
lifetime in prison for allegedly defending herself from her abusive boyfriend while he 
was hitting and choking her.  
Treatment by Prosecutors  
 Another theme present throughout the eight cases I read was the prosecutors 
framing the women defendants as vindictive liars during trial, and often casting doubt 
that the women were ever abused at all. Women were depicted by prosecutors as 
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having ulterior motives for killing their partners and making up abuse as an excuse. 
This finding reinforced the literature I presented earlier about how cultural perceptions 
of women can influence jury decisions in homicide cases where a woman defendant is 
pleading self-defense. Prosecutors may play on the stereotypes that women are 
irrational, crazy, reactive, or overly emotional, and in turn portray the abusive partners 
as innocent and noble. 
 One prominent case exhibiting this kind of prosecutorial conduct was Ewing v. 
Washington, which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
Southern Division heard in 2010.159 In the case, Shirley Ewing shot and killed her 
abusive boyfriend of thirteen years named Leon Smithers. The day of the killing, Ewing 
and Smithers were hanging out with Ewing’s brother and two other friends at Smithers’ 
house, drinking and playing games. Ewing and Smithers got into an argument, and 
Smithers called the police to take Ewing away. Ewing was brought to the police station, 
given a ticket, and released later that night. According to Ewing’s testimony, Smithers 
had been texting her while she was at the station asking her to come back over, so she 
returned to his house. When she arrived, she sat on his lap and they started talking to 
reconcile what happened earlier, which escalated into an argument. Smithers slapped 
Ewing and she slapped him back. He then began to punch and kick her, so she reached 
under the chair where she knew he kept a gun. Ewing was on the floor from being 
punched and kicked, and as she was getting up, she pointed the gun at him with the 
intention of getting him to back away so she could leave the house. The gun discharged 
once as she was getting up, hitting Smithers. Ewing’s brother, who had a history of 
violence, called her name, so she turned in his direction and the gun discharged again. 
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Another friend who was present came toward her, so she shot the gun at him twice and 
fled the house. 
 At trial, Ewing claimed she killed Smithers in self-defense. Her bother had testified 
on behalf of the prosecution that Ewing had brought her own gun to the house and 
intended to shoot Smithers. Ewing maintained that her brother was lying. She testified 
to the extent of Smithers’s abuse. She said he beat her every week or two and had twice 
assaulted her using a gun, which, as I discussed, is correlated with a much higher 
likelihood of femicide in an abusive relationship.160 Her testimony was to no avail. The 
jury in Genesee County Circuit Court, Michigan convicted her of one count of second-
degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than 
murder, and felony firearm. She was originally sentenced to fifty to eighty-three years 
in prison for the murder charge, plus five to ten years for each assault charge, plus two 
years for the felony firearm charge. She appealed her sentenced and was re-sentenced to 
thirty-one years and three months to fifty years for the homicide charge, with the same 
sentences for the other charges.  
 In her habeas petition, Ewing claimed that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by evoking sympathy for Smithers, appealing to the jurors to do their civic duty, and 
denigrating Ewing and her lawyer, among other claims. During trial, the prosecutor 
kept referring to Smithers as innocent and repeatedly made sympathy-evoking 
comments. He lamented to the jury about how Smithers would “never eat another ice 
cream cone” or “spend another Christmas with his family”.161 The prosecutor also called 
Ewing a liar who was telling a “self-interested story”.162 He said she was “guilty as sin,” 
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and called her “miss congeniality” and “the terminator”.163 The prosecutor also called 
her self-defense claim laughable and desperate. Ewing claimed the cumulative effect of 
the prosecutor’s conduct rendered her trial unfair. These claims are obviously intended 
to paint Ewing as conniving and heartless while making Smithers seem innocent.  
 In deciding whether or not to grant Ewing the habeas petition based on the 
prosecutor’s conduct, the court validated the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s remarks. To 
the claim about the prosecutor evoking sympathy and framing Smithers as innocent, 
the court said this characterization was not calculated to stir up the jury’s prejudices. To 
the claim that the prosecutor denigrated Ewing by calling her a guilty, self-interested 
liar, the court said this was a permissible attack on Ewing’s character. To the claim that 
the prosecutor denigrated the self-defense claim by calling it laughable and desperate, 
the court said these comments attacked the defense on its merits and urged the jury to 
question the credibility of Ewing’s testimony. In order to get habeas relief for the 
prosecutorial misconduct claim, Ewing would have had to show that her due process 
was violated, meaning the prosecutorial misconduct was so apparent and persistent 
that it permeated the entire trial.164 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, Southern Division said she had not done so. As far as I know, 
Shirley Ewing is imprisoned in the Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Ypsilanti, 
Michigan along with Rebecca Shimel.  
 This kind of prosecutorial conduct was not isolated to Ewing. In Seaman v. 
Washington, a case that I explore in the next section, the prosecutor facing Nancy 
Seaman called her a liar and questioned her about her religious beliefs, attempting to 
cast doubt on Seaman’s claim that she was Catholic and stayed with her abusive 
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husband partly because of her marital vows. The prosecutor also wrongly recounted a 
key detail of the killing at trial, alleged to be an expert on battered spouse syndrome 
herself, and introduced an anonymous unauthenticated letter as evidence against 
Seaman at trial. In her habeas petition, Seaman claimed that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct for these reasons, along with six others. On every count, the court ruled 
over and over again that although the prosecutor’s conduct may have been improper, it 
did not deprive Seaman of a fair trial. In another case I explain in the next section, 
Sanford v. Stewart, the prosecutor attacked Celita Sanford’s credibility by calling into 
question the extent and severity of her boyfriend’s abuse and whether she was attacked 
on the day of the killing at all. The prosecutor also attempted to undermine Sanford’s 
self-defense claim by saying that she could have just left the house to flee her 
boyfriend’s abuse. Time and time again, prosecutors attempted to undermine the 
women defendants’ credibility and label them as liars.  
Battered Spouse Syndrome Expert Testimony 
 Last, one of the things I found most interesting in the cases I read was the role of 
battered spouse syndrome expert testimony. Battered spouse syndrome testimony was 
not relevant to all of the cases I read, but for the ones that it was, it played a central role. 
Often times, in the original trials, the defense counsel had chosen not to pursue expert 
battered spouse syndrome testimony, which provided grounds for the women to claim 
ineffective assistance of counsel in their habeas petitions. In their petitions, the women 
stressed how the presence of battered spouse syndrome testimony would have helped 
the jury understand the effects of prolonged abuse and contextualized some of the 
women’s actions that would not have made sense otherwise. The lack of battered 
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spouse syndrome testimony left the women defendants vulnerable to misinformed 
juries.  
 The first case I read, Seymour v. Walker, suffered from a lack of battered spouse 
syndrome expert testimony. It appeared before the Sixth Circuit Court in 2000, after 
Beverly Seymour had been convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing her abusive 
ex-husband Richard Reams.165 The couple had been married for eleven years. After 
being unable to have a child, they entered into a contract with another woman in which 
she would attempt to get impregnated by Reams and then give the child to the couple 
to raise. The woman became impregnated by a different man, but still gave the child to 
Seymour and Reams. According to Seymour, their marriage was abusive, and she 
eventually filed for divorce. The divorce was finalized, but the question of their child’s 
custody was left up in the air until the days immediately preceding the killing.  
 Reams ended up receiving custody of their daughter, and went to Seymour’s 
apartment while she was not home in the days following the decision. Seymour testified 
that when she arrived home, Reams “went into a little rage,” hitting her and slamming 
her against the entrance.166 At one point, as he was coming toward her to continue his 
attacks, she grabbed the gun off of the kitchen table and warned him that she was not 
kidding around. Seymour testified that the gun then fired without her intending to. She 
did not remember pulling the trigger but did remember hearing gunfire. She fled the 
apartment without knowing the bullet struck Reams. After the incident, Seymour 
checked herself into a motel and attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on aspirin. 
She was eventually discovered by a friend and rushed to the hospital.  
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 Seymour testified in self-defense at her own trial. She was convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter and a firearm charge, which resulted in a sentence of eight to twenty-five 
years in prison plus an additional three years. As with the other women, if the jury had 
believed her self-defense claim, she would have been considered legally innocent and 
walked free.  
 There were a whole host of issues with Seymour’s original trial that she raised in 
her habeas petition. She claimed her due process was violated when the prosecution 
called a surprise witness without notifying her, and the court refused to let her call her 
own witness to rebut the surprise witness’s testimony. Furthermore, she claimed she 
was subjected to an unconstitutional interrogation when the county sheriff questioned 
her while she was in the intensive care unit at the hospital after her suicide attempt. She 
claimed she was not read her Miranda rights and was too drugged and ill to voluntarily 
waive her right to an attorney. The sheriff had only obtained a verbal waiver, and not a 
written one. The court did not grant her habeas relief on either of these issues.  
 Seymour also claimed that her trial counsel was ineffective for seventeen different 
reasons. Most relevantly, she claimed her lawyer was ineffective for failing to introduce 
evidence on battered spouse syndrome. While I do not have access to Seymour’s 
original habeas petition, the court’s decision said she painstakingly laid out the specific 
elements of battered spouse syndrome that matched the evidence and her behavior. 
Prior to trial, she was not evaluated by an expert or medically tested to determine if she 
exhibited battered spouse syndrome symptoms. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit Court 
said that such evidence would have been admissible, but that Seymour had not proved 
that her lawyer was deficient for not presenting such evidence. In order to be successful 
in her claim, Seymour would have had to show that the outcome of her case would 
have been different if battered spouse syndrome evidence was introduced, a conclusion 
 
 
63 
that the court said was “simply too speculative— especially in light of the facts that 
Seymour was no longer involved in the abusive relationship and that Seymour herself 
had acted violently toward Reams prior to the shooting.”167  
 Here, the court’s implication is that Seymour and Reams’ marriage being over 
somehow made battered spouse syndrome testimony less relevant, as if the effects of 
abuse on victims somehow go away after an abusive relationship ends. This assertion 
shows a lack of understanding among circuit court judges about battering and its 
effects, further underscoring the necessity of expert testimony at trial. Furthermore, it 
seems exceedingly difficult to prove that battered spouse syndrome evidence would 
have changed the outcome of the case, which is what the court was asking Seymour to 
do. These decisions are necessarily speculative to some degree. Seymour was the first 
case I read where a woman killed her abusive partner and claimed self-defense. A 
woman who claimed she endured abuse for eleven years allegedly shot her husband on 
accident to defend herself from his attacks, attempted suicide, lived, and then faced a 
criminal justice process that seemed unconstitutional at points and unsympathetic to 
her experiences throughout. It exemplified the problems I had read about, but it was 
not in theory. It was someone’s life.  
 One case in which a lack of battered spouse syndrome expert testimony especially 
posed an issue was Sanford v. Stewart. It was the most recent case I read, appearing 
before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern 
Division in 2017.168 In the case, Celita Sanford shot and killed her boyfriend, who she 
had dated for eleven years and lived with for six years. She claimed that he had abused 
her for years, which multiple witnesses testified to at trial. The day of the killing, they 
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had gotten into an argument in which she requested he move out of the house because 
she had caught him cheating on her. Sanford heard a pop and saw that her boyfriend 
had fired a gun, but the bullet had not hit her. He then began physically assaulting her 
and choking her. The choking scared Sanford, because she had passed out the last time 
he choked her. Sanford’s boyfriend then threw her on the ground and started looking 
for his gun that he had discarded earlier, but Sanford found it first. She testified that she 
picked up the gun and started backing away from her boyfriend, who then lunged 
toward her. She fired the gun and dropped it as her boyfriend grabbed his side. At trial, 
she said in that moment she feared for her life: “I shot him because I feared for my life 
being that he already shot once and then when he said, where the f**k is his gun, and I 
didn't know where it was, but when I saw him looking through the clothes and I found 
it first I feared for my life and I may not be here. It's a lot of women that didn't get to 
make it.”169 At trial, she presented a straightforward claim of self-defense. Still, with the 
record of abuse and the evidence corroborating her testimony, the jury did not 
exonerate her. Sanford was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and felony firearm 
and sentenced to three years and three months to fifteen years in prison for the 
manslaughter charge, plus two years for the felony firearm charge.  
 In her habeas petition, Sanford claimed the she had received ineffective assistance 
of counsel because her lawyer failed to investigate and call an expert on battered spouse 
syndrome. In her petition, Sanford laid out all the reasons why battered spouse 
syndrome testimony would have contextualized her otherwise puzzling behavior to the 
jury. Sanford argued that battered spouse syndrome testimony could have explained 
why she initially told the police that her boyfriend had accidentally discharged the gun, 
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because battered women often protect their abusers. She still thought her boyfriend was 
alive when she talked to the police, which explains why she wanted to protect him. 
Battered spouse syndrome testimony could have also discredited the prosecutor’s 
claims that I mentioned earlier. The prosecutor questioned why Sanford did not just 
leave the house, and battered spouse syndrome testimony would have explained that 
battered women often feel that they have no choice other than to kill their abusers, 
because leaving is not an option.  
 Battered spouse syndrome testimony could have also bolstered her credibility in 
the eyes of the jury, which was under attack by the prosecutor. The prosecutor was 
casting doubt on the extent and severity of past abuse and whether Sanford was 
actually attacked on the day of the killing at all. Further, battered spouse syndrome 
testimony would have explained why her mom never knew of the abuse she suffered, 
because abusers go to great lengths to conceal their abuse. Last, it would have explained 
why her boyfriend’s violence escalated when she intended to leave him, which is 
characteristic of abusive relationships.  
 The court acknowledged the merit of her arguments but found them insufficient to 
establish that the lack of battered spouse syndrome testimony prejudiced her trial. The 
court rebutted her claims by saying that this case was too standard of a self-defense case 
for battered spouse syndrome testimony to be necessary or helpful. In the exact words 
of the court: “As we view [battered spouse syndrome] in the context of a defendant 
raising a self-defense claim, it would only be useful in assisting a jury where the victim 
was killed under circumstances that did not outwardly appear to present an imminent 
threat of great bodily harm or death.”170 Sanford’s claims assert that this is just not true. 
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Battered spouse syndrome testimony can be useful in cases that may be more standard 
and reflect the more masculine notions of violence discussed earlier. As Sanford 
highlighted, battered spouse syndrome testimony can contextualize an abused person’s 
behavior both before and after a self-defense killing that would be otherwise confusing 
and indicate guilt to the jury. These things matter for convictions and sentencing. 
Battered spouse syndrome is not irrelevant whenever a woman kills her abusive partner 
in too “standard” of a case, because she may still experience effects associated with 
battered spouse syndrome.  
 The last case I discuss in depth is Seaman v.  Washington. In this case, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division ultimately 
granted the defendant habeas relief on the ground that her trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to use an expert witness at trial, therefore mandating her release.171 It was the 
only case I read where a federal court granted habeas relief. I am not sure what made 
this case’s appeal successful compared to others. The court’s decision mentioned that 
the defendant was a schoolteacher, suggesting that she may have had a high enough 
income to hire a good lawyer. Regardless, the ruling in the defendant’s favor was 
appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court, which reversed the decision and remanded the 
case. Nevertheless, Seaman’s case illuminates how crucial battered spouse syndrome 
testimony can be, and how its absence can make for ill-informed convictions.  
 Nancy Seaman killed her husband Robert Seaman, who she claimed was both 
physically and verbally abusive for many years. He died by blunt force, having been 
struck on the head with a hatchet at least sixteen times and stabbed at least twenty-one 
times with a knife. The day of the killing, she claimed he confronted her about her plans 
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to leave him, having discovered that she bought a condominium three months prior. 
Nancy testified that he threw her against the fridge, and then picked up a knife and 
drew it across her hand. She tried to escape, but the key was missing from the dead bolt 
in the front door, so she ran to the garage. As she was running into the garage, her 
husband shoved her down. As she was getting back up, she felt a hatchet on top of the 
generator, which she grabbed and swung at him countless times to fend him off. She 
continued to swing the hatchet, testifying that she was terrified and believed that if her 
husband got his hands on her, he would kill her. She then grabbed a knife and stabbed 
him.  
 The federal district court decision contained ample material about other witnesses’ 
testimonies. Both of Nancy and Robert Seaman’s sons testified, offering conflicting 
testimonies. One said he had never witnessed any abuse and was skeptical of his 
mother’s testimony. The other said he had personally witnessed abuse, and that his 
relationship with his father had soured when he had confronted his father about it a 
year prior. He testified that he knew his mother was planning on leaving his father, but 
that he had been instructed to keep it a secret because his mother feared for her life if 
his father found out. Nancy was an elementary school teacher, and multiple school 
employees testified that they witnessed signs of abuse. The principal testified that he 
recalled a very severe black eye in the two years leading up to the killing. Two teachers 
and the head custodian also testified that they observed various injuries on her during 
her time at the school.  
 At trial, Nancy claimed that she exhibited signs of battered spouse syndrome and 
killed her husband in self-defense. The prosecution’s theory was that the killing was 
premeditated, hinging on the fact that she had purchased the hatchet the day before. 
Nancy’s explanation for this was that the yard was unkept and needed trimming, which 
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was corroborated by evidence that her and her husband had been in a dispute over 
yard work and it was unkept as a result. The court convicted Nancy of first-degree 
murder and sentenced her to life in prison. 
 In her habeas petition, Nancy listed multiple ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. The most relevant for discussion was the claim that her counsel was ineffective 
for failing to adequately prepare and use an expert witness, Dr. Lenore Walker, because 
this claim led to the court granting habeas relief. Nancy argued that her counsel failed 
to have Dr. Walker independently assess her, which left Dr. Walker vulnerable to cross-
examination at trial. Further, Nancy claimed her counsel lacked an understanding of the 
extent of permissible expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome under Michigan 
law, which left the jury without an expert opinion as to whether Nancy’s behavior was 
consistent with the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome. 
 At Nancy’s original trial, two clinical experts on battered spouse syndrome 
testified, Dr. Walker and Dr. Abramsky. Neither were allowed to disclose their opinions 
or conclusions on Nancy’s case, at the instruction of Nancy’s lawyer. They were only 
allowed to testify about what battered spouse syndrome was in general, with no 
specific relation to Nancy’s case. Dr. Abramsky had met with Nancy on two separate 
occasions and performed psychological tests on her, but could not testify to his results 
or conclusions. Dr. Walker had never met with Nancy, and could only testify about the 
characteristics of battered spouse syndrome, without connecting them to Nancy’s 
actions. 
 In Nancy’s appeal to the state appellate court, she attached a letter from Dr. 
Walker detailing how Nancy’s case related to battered spouse syndrome and how her 
behavior was consistent with the characteristics of battered spouse syndrome. This is 
what Dr. Walker would have testified in the original trial if Nancy’s counsel had 
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allowed it. During the district court evidentiary hearing, Dr. Walker testified that 
Nancy’s “actions before, during, and after the killing were consistent with someone 
suffering from battered spouse syndrome”.172 She contextualized for the court some of 
Nancy’s puzzling behavior. Despite claims that she had been abused for decades, 
Nancy showed very little physical evidence of abuse. Dr. Walker testified that often 
abusers know where to hit their victims so as not to cause visible bruising. After she 
killed her husband, Nancy covered his body and cleaned up the garage instead of 
calling the police right away. Dr. Walker testified that this behavior was consistent with 
someone who exhibited battered spouse syndrome. During trial, Nancy was flat and 
unemotional, which the jury analyzed as showing a lack of remorse for a premeditated 
killing. Dr. Walker testified that this kind of emotional conduct can be the result of 
years of abuse.  
 Further, upon review, the district court found that the trial counsel was wrong that 
expert witnesses could only testify about general characteristics of battered spouse 
syndrome. State case law at the time indicated that expert witnesses were allowed to 
testify that a defendant’s actions were consistent with someone exhibiting battered 
spouse syndrome.  
 In order to receive habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, Nancy had to 
pass a two-prong test that was established under the case Strickland v. Washington. First, 
Nancy had to show that her counsel was deficient, which required showing that her 
lawyer made errors so serious that he was not functioning as “the counsel” guaranteed 
by the Sixth Amendment.173 The Sixth Circuit Court found that the counsel’s “failure to 
argue for the admissibility of the full breadth of experience testimony allowed under 
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Michigan law, his failure to present that testimony, and his failure to arrange for Dr. 
Walker to personally interview and evaluate Petitioner satisfie[d] the first prong of 
Strickland”.174 Second, Nancy had to show that her counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced her. This requires that she show that there is a reasonable probability that 
without her counsel’s errors, the outcome of the case would have been different. The 
District Court found that for the reasons mentioned earlier, combined with the lack of 
overwhelming evidence that supported premeditation and deliberation, there was a 
“reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance had 
that additional testimony been presented”.175 Thus, Nancy satisfied both prongs of the 
Strickland test, adequately showing that her trial counsel was ineffective.  
 This was the only case out of eight where a woman who killed her abusive partner 
was granted habeas relief. After the court siding against the woman defendant over and 
over again, Seaman represented a sliver of hope, and then back-pedaled. It showed 
appellate courts were capable of identifying and rectifying critical errors in original 
trials, but weren’t capable of making their decisions definite.  
Limitations 
 While my findings were notable and informative, they were constrained by a few 
research limitations. First, as I mentioned in my introduction, all of the cases I read were 
appellate court decisions, because those were the only documents that were available 
on online databases. My preference was to use both original and appellate court 
decisions to see what percentage of women who pleaded self-defense to homicide 
 
174 Seaman v. Washington, U.S. Dist. Lexis 115588, (2010), 9. 
175 Ibid., 12. 
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charges received convictions overall, and if the original decisions illuminated anything 
new about these cases. In order to retrieve all of the original trial documents, however, I 
would have had to drive to all of the courthouses that the cases were originally litigated 
in and scan the physical copies of the decisions, which was not feasible if I wanted to 
cover a considerable amount of territory. Thus, I could only read the decisions of cases 
in which the defendant was already convicted and was appealing his or her case. This 
may have biased the results toward defendants with the resources and means to hire 
appellate counsel. Additionally, this may have biased the results toward defendants 
who had did not have clear-cut cases, as they were originally convicted, but believed 
they had a compelling argument for having their conviction overturned. It could have 
also biased the results in ways that are completely unknown and unpredictable.   
 Second, as I explained earlier, out of the 234 cases appellate cases that I read, only 
ten of them had women defendants. The population of men defendants compared to 
women, 224 to ten, was too imbalanced to do any kind of rigorous statistical analysis of 
the numerical findings I presented. Further, there was a high amount of variability in 
the homicide charges and convictions being appealed. I included any homicide charge 
in the pool of cases that I read, which ranged from involuntary manslaughter to first-
degree premeditated murder. They were not standardized to all be the same kind of 
homicide case. My findings were interesting nonetheless, but did not carry the 
statistical soundness that a designed experiment would have.  
 Finally, I want to address a potential concern that the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is only reflective of the Midwest, and not the U.S. as a whole. While I was 
drawn to this jurisdiction because of personal connection, I was also aware that the 
Sixth Circuit Court covered both urban and rural areas and was considered politically 
neutral, and therefore less likely to skew my findings than a historically conservative or 
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historically liberal circuit court. This awareness was borne out of my personal 
connection to the Midwest, because I had a better understanding of the cultural terrain. 
According to Visual First Amendment, a data visualization website produced by the 
Pratt School of Information that compiled all Circuit Court cases from 1943 to 2010 and 
calculated a ratio of liberal to conservative decisions for each circuit, the Sixth Circuit 
Court is one of the four courts with the most balanced decisions.176 The Sixth Circuit 
Court had only slightly more conservative decisions than liberal ones. ⁠ This was far from 
the case for the most conservative courts, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts, which 
cover Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi and Alabama, Georgia, and Florida 
respectively, as well as the most liberal courts, the First and the Ninth Circuit Courts, 
which cover much of New England and the West Coast and Alaska. Given all of the 
options, the Sixth Circuit Court was one of the least likely to have its rulings lean one 
way politically and misrepresent the country as a whole.   
Conclusion 
Summing Up 
This thesis has examined U.S. self-defense laws and how they affect women who kill 
in self-defense. I argue that because modern self-defense laws originated from laws 
exclusively written by men to protect men in masculine situations of violence, they do 
not work well to protect women who kill in self-defense in the U.S. today. Unlike men, 
who often defend themselves from violent attacks by random assailants or during fights 
 
176 “Circuit Court Map.” Visual First Amendment. Pratt School of Information. Accessed 
April 4, 2020. http://visualfa.org/circuit-court-map/. 
 
 
 
73 
between physical equals, women often defend themselves from abusive intimate 
partners.  
The literature I reviewed illuminated the frequency and severity of intimate partner 
violence and the toll it takes on victims. Due to the ineffectiveness of the criminal legal 
system in halting intimate partner violence, among a host of other reasons, many 
women do not see pursuing legal action against their perpetrators as a viable option to 
ending the abuse. Leaving an abusive relationship is often not an option either, as 
research has shown that the most dangerous time for a battered woman is when she is 
attempting to leave her abuser.177 Given the lack of exit options and the danger that 
abusive partners pose, some women feel that they either have to kill their abusers or be 
killed.  
It may not be immediately obvious why current self-defense laws would pose a 
problem for women who kill in self-defense, but a closer look at the language can 
illuminate why this is. Two hallmarks of current U.S. self-defense laws are the 
reasonableness requirement, which means that the individual who acted in self-defense 
must have reasonably believed it was necessary to use deadly force, and the imminence 
requirement, which means that the threat of death or great bodily harm must have been 
imminent in order for self-defense to be justified.  
The reasonableness requirement can be problematic for women because 
reasonableness was historically judged in a courtroom by asking what a reasonable man 
would do in the given scenario. Additionally, the reasonableness requirement leaves the 
woman to attempt to convince the jury that was she did was reasonable and not an 
 
177 Campbell et al., “Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study.” 
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emotional impulse or overreaction, which can be difficult to do because of cultural 
perceptions of women that can make their way into the courtroom.  
The imminence requirement can also be problematic for women because it can be 
difficult to prove that death by an abusive intimate partner was imminent. If a woman 
believes that her abusive partner will be the death of her, but waits until that death is 
imminent during an abusive episode, then she may actually die because she does not 
have the physical ability to defend herself at that time. Some women act before this 
point, when their abusers are vulnerable, because that is the only time that they can 
defend themselves. Additionally, it can be even more difficult for battered women to 
prove that a life-threatening abusive episode was imminent because they often 
recognize signs that precede abuse that might not be evident to a jury, such as a 
slammed door, a code word, or a hand signal.  
My own research attempted to answer the question as to how women who claim 
self-defense to homicide charges fare in court compared to men. From my review of 234 
cases in which the defendant pleaded self-defense to homicide charges, all from the 21st 
century and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals or one of the federal district courts 
under its jurisdiction, the women defendants were sentenced to slightly more time than 
the men defendants, serving on average 61.423 years compared to 61.23 years. Out of 
the ten women defendants, eight of them had killed an abusive intimate partner. Of 
these eight cases, seven took place in private homes. My research indicates that women 
defendants claiming self-defense to homicide charges almost exclusively killed abusive 
intimate partners, yet they received the same prison sentences on average as the men 
defendants, who often killed strangers, acquaintances, or friends in public over drugs, 
money, bar fights, and family disputes.  
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I carefully reviewed the eight cases in which women claimed they killed abusive 
intimate partners in self-defense, and identified four main challenges that these women 
encountered in the courtroom. First, the women had trouble convincing juries and 
judges that they were abused if they did not have a lengthy paper trail of police reports 
documenting a history of abuse. Second, abusive men were viewed as non-deadly if 
they were unarmed. Third, prosecutors often portrayed women defendants as liars with 
ulterior motives, attempting to undermine their credibility and put their experiences of 
abuse under scrutiny. Fourth, the court often misused or misunderstood expert 
testimony relating to battered women, which had the potential to make a significant 
difference in how the juries perceived the defendants’ actions and understood the 
effects of prolonged abuse on women. Of the eight cases I reviewed, one of them had 
success on appeal, but even this ruling was overturned. Even after litigating their 
experiences of abuse and attempting to convince multiple courts that they acted out of 
fear for their lives, none of the women had success in permanently having their 
convictions overturned and walking free.  
Policy Implications and Moving Forward 
While there is no one solution to making self-defense laws protect women 
defendants just as well as men, my findings do carry a few specific policy implications, 
many of which center on the education of lawyers, jurors, and judges on the reality of 
intimate partner violence. First, my findings point toward a need for a broad and sound 
understanding within the courtroom of why battered women often do not leave abusive 
relationships or rely on the criminal legal system for protection, an understanding that, 
based on my research, is missing. If this was understood, then a lack of documented 
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intimate partner violence incidents would not be damning for women defendants, as it 
at times was in the cases I reviewed.  
Second, my research calls for a rethinking of the standard of reasonableness imposed 
on battered women who kill their abusers in self-defense, because the specific factors 
that influence what battered women believe to be reasonable are not reflected in the 
reasonable person standard as it is often being applied. Is it reasonable for a battered 
woman to use a weapon to defend herself against an unarmed abuser? A definition of 
reasonableness that considers the experiences of battered women indicates that it would 
be. This rethinking can be extended to conventional definitions of imminence as well. 
Kentucky’s imminence statute, which states that the defendant’s belief that danger is 
imminent can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious abuse, can serve as a 
model.  
Third, the widespread education of lawyers, jurors, and judges on intimate partner 
violence and its effects on victims would be partly achieved by a better use of expert 
testimony. Although such expert testimony is routinely admitted across the country, 
trial counsel in the cases I reviewed either did not understand how to use it effectively 
or chose to forgo it entirely out of belief that it would not be helpful. Better use of expert 
testimony could help courtroom officials understand why the framework used to 
evaluate a standard man defendant’s self-defense claim often does not work when 
evaluating a woman defendant’s self-defense claim.  
The natural next step in this project would be to research which self-defense law 
revisions are effective in helping women successfully plead self-defense in a courtroom. 
Jurisdictions in which specific policy adjustments have already been made would need 
to be identified, and there would need to be a rigorous examination of how women 
pleading self-defense fared in the coatroom before and after such policies went into 
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effect. The revisions that prove to be effective and just, the ones that consider the 
experiences and perspectives of women just as much as those of men, can then be 
implemented in other jurisdictions, eventually becoming the new status quo. The law is 
not static. It is possible to identify its deficiencies and adjust accordingly, so that the law 
can protect everyone equally. That is the hope of my thesis.  
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